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ABSTRACT
THE RIGA MISSION: THE REPORTS OF THE FIRST AMERICAN
OUTPOST ON THE SOVIET BORDER, 1924-1933
Jeffrey Acosta
Old Dominion University, 1992
Director: Dr. Lorraine Lees
From 1917 to 1933, the United States did not recognize
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

In 1920 the United

States established conditions for recognition.

First, the

Soviet Union had to pay all debts owed to the United States
government and its citizens by previous Russian and Soviet
governments.

In addition,

all propaganda

and

subversive

activities sponsored by the Soviet Union in the United States
had to cease.

During this period, the Division of Eastern

European Affairs (DEEA) studied and collected data about the
Soviet Union from its main "outpost" at the United States
Mission in Riga, Latvia.
in Riga

The Russian specialists of the DEEA

and Washington used the

data

collected

to write

scholarly reports about the Soviet Union and the Communist
International.

This thesis will analyze the reports written

by the Russian specialists at the Riga mission and illustrate
that

the

reports

successfully

defended

the

policy

of

nonrecognition by accurately demonstrating the Soviet Union's
support of subversive propaganda activities

in the United

States.
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INTRODUCTION

In December 1918, President Woodrow Wilson approved a
recommendation by Secretary of State Robert Lansing that the
United States not grant the Bolshevik government of Russia "de
facto” recognition.

The United States was opposed to the

communist ideology of the Bolshevik government led by Vladimir
I.

Lenin

which

revolution.

advocated

a

violent

proletarian

world

Within four years however, the Soviet Russian

government had changed its foreign policy to one of peaceful
coexistence with the capitalist nations until economic and
political conditions were ripe for the inevitable socialist
revolution.

Until that time socialism would be built within

the

Russia.

Soviet

The

United

States

government

gradually changed its position concerning Soviet Russia.

also
In

1920 Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby indicated that the
United States would recognize the Soviet Union provided three
conditions were met.

First, the Soviet Union

debts

United

owed

to

governments.

the
Second,

the

States
Soviet

by
Union

must pay all

previous
must

Russian

compensate

American citizens for private property lost as a result of the
Bolshevik revolution.
its

support

of

all

Finally, the Soviet Union had to cease
propaganda

and

subversive

activities

1
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sponsored by the Communist International in the United States
and its territories.

As a result of the Soviet government's

refusal to accept these conditions, a policy of nonrecognition
existed between the United States and the Soviet Union until
1933.
Throughout

the

period

of

nonrecognition,

the

United

States government remained interested in the activities of the
Soviet

Union

and

its

revolutionary

International (Comintern).

agent,

the

Communist

The Division of Eastern European

Affairs (DEEA) was established within the State Department to
observe the Soviet Union and the Comintern and to defend the
policy

of nonrecognition until

the

Soviet

government

was

prepared to meet United States conditions for recognition.
An

"outpost"

or

"window"

was

established

by

the

State

Department near the Soviet Union from which a specialist corps
of foreign service officers (FSOs) could observe and study the
Soviet Union.

The "outpost" was located in Riga, Latvia close

to the Soviet Union border.

The Russian experts at the Riga

mission studied in a scholarly manner all aspects of the
Soviet Union.
not

limited

agriculture,

The subject of their reports included, but was
to,

politics,

economics,

the Soviet armed forces,

religion,

industry,

foreign policy,

and

foreign trade, as well as the Soviet Union's control of the
Comintern.
In response to a variety of domestic and international
political pressures, President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided
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to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933, and called on the Riga
experts for advice during the recognition negotiations.
normal

diplomatic

relations

were

established,

After

the

Riga

specialists continued to serve in the government throughout
the 1930's, the Second World War and the Cold War.
According to the Cold War specialist Daniel Yergin, there
are two axioms which could be used to describe the historical
relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States.
The first he called the Yalta axiom in which the United States
"downplayed

the

role

of

ideology

and

the

foreign

policy

consequences of authoritarian domestic practices, and instead
saw the Soviet Union behaving like a traditional Great Power
within the international system."1 The second axiom he dubbed
the Riga axiom in which the United States treated the Soviet
Union

"as

a

possibilities

world
of

revolutionary

coexistence,

state,

committed

denying

to

the

unrelenting

ideological warfare, powered by a messianic drive for world
mastery."2 The Yalta axiom, which Yergin believed guided the
policy

of

Franklin

D.

Roosevelt,

led

to

Soviet-American

cooperation, while the Riga axiom, followed by Harry S. Truman
and his successors, both caused and prolonged the Cold War.
Yergin and many other scholars agree that after 1945 the

1 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace; The Origins of the Cold
War. (Boston:
Houghton, Mifflin, Co. 1977;
Penguin Books,
1990), 11.
2 Ibid.
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Riga specialists, particularly George F. Kennan, Charles F.
Bohlen, Loy Henderson and Robert F. Kelley, were influential
in the development of the policies implemented by the United
States to contain the Soviet Union and its communist allies.3
Yergin claimed however, that the above named specialists based
their recommendations on the anti-Bolshevik attitudes they had
adopted as a result of their service at Riga; an experience
which had simply "confirmed predispositions and reinvigorated
what had been the dominant American diplomatic response to the
Bolshevik revolution."4
It can be demonstrated that as a result of their studies
between 1919 and 1933, the Riga specialists were hostile to
the political ideology of the Soviet Union.

They believed

that the Soviet government's support of the Comintern and its
subsidiary organization,
States,

constituted

the Communist Party of the United

illegal

interference

affairs of the United States.

in

the

internal

In order to be treated as a

legitimate government, the Soviet Union had to acknowledge its
international responsibilities.

However, as an examination

3 Bernard A. Weisberger, Cold War Cold Peace; The United
States and Russia Since 1945 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.,
1984), 64-75; Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wisemen:
Six Friends and the World They Made (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1986), 347-85; David Mayers, George Kennan and the
Dilemmas of Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988), 27; John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment:
A
Critical Appraisal of Post War American National Security
Policy. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 25-53.
4 Yergin, 35.
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of the Riga reports will demonstrate, the purpose of their
studies between 1922 and 1933 was not to develop a policy to
contain the Soviet Union and world communism, but to insure
that

the

Soviet

government

established by Colby

met

the

for recognition.

three

conditions

In addition,

they

wanted to insure that when recognition occurred it would be
on terms favorable to the
Riga

mission

which

served

United States.
it

was

scholarly view of the Soviet Union,

The DEEA and the

created

to

provide

a

in service of American

policy, and it served that function well.
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Chapter 1
THE ROAD TO NONRECOGNITION

Formal diplomatic relations between the United States and
Russia1 began

in

180.

commercial treaty.

In

1832

the

two

nations

signed

a

Relations between the United States and

Russia were distant but correct; with each country knowing
little of the other.

The sale of Alaska in 1867 and the first

wave of Russian immigrants to the United States resulting from
the Tsarist pogroms2 increased American interest in Russia by
the 1880's.3 In 1885, the renowned American explorer George
F. Kennan,4 traveled across Russia.

When Kennan returned to

1 For the purpose of this thesis "Russia" designates the
country that existed until November 8, 1917. After that date
Russia will be called the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
or the "Soviet Union."
2 The Russian government sanctioned attacks against the
Jews in 1881, 1903 and 1906.
3 George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 19171920, vol. 1, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1956), 17; David MacKenzie and Michael W.
Curran, A History of Russia and the Soviet Union (Homewood:
The Dorsey Press, 1977), 399-41; Barbara Jelavich, St.
Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet Foreign Policy.
1814-1974 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) , 16768 .
4 In this thesis there are two George F. Kennans who were
related. The elder George F. Kennan (1845-1923) had a younger
cousin, Kossuth Kennan.
On February 16, 1904 Kossuth's son
6
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the United States, he wrote a book about his journey to Russia
which was very critical of the Russian government.
was entitled Siberia and the Exile System.

The book

Kennan wrote

numerous articles about Russia for the next three decades.
By the end of the 19th century, he and Dr. Samuel Harper of
the University

of Chicago were recognized as

the

leading

experts in the United States on Russia.5
The elder Kennan's writings about Russia under the rule
of the tsars sparked interest in the United States about this
distant

country.

Many

prominent

native-born

American

liberals, inspired by Kennan's work, formed an anti-tsarist
group called "The Friends of Russian Freedom."

This group

included the elder Kennan and Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain).6
The organization supported Russian political activists and
minority groups in Russia.

They also lobbied

Congress not

to support treaties which would open trade relations with
Russia until democratic political reforms were enacted.
A second group of anti-Tsarist lobbyists was also formed
was born and was named after the elder George F. Kennan. The
elder Kennan did not have a family and after a visit with his
cousin Kossuth, developed a close relationship with his young
namesake.
Inspired by the elder George Kennan's stories of
Russia, the younger George F. Kennan pursued a career as an
American diplomat and leading scholar on the Soviet Union.
5 George F. Kennan, Memoirs; 1925-1950 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1967), 8-9; Mayers, 19-20.
6 Other American liberals who were members of "The
Friends of Russian Freedom" included: Samuel Gompers, Robert
M. LaFollette, Lynn Abbott, Jane Addams and William Lloyd
Garrison.
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during

this

period.

This

group

immigrants to the United States.

consisted

of

Russian

Like the native-born group,

they worked to block commercial treaties with the Russian
government.

However,

there was

a

fundamental

difference

between these two groups concerning the type of political and
social
Russian
Russia.

changes

they wanted

Freedom"

hoped

to

for Russia.
see

"The

a political

Friends of

revolution

in

They envisioned a government assuming power which

would convert Russia into a democratic republic similar to the
United States.

The immigrant lobby, by contrast, hoped to see

a social revolution occur, during which the peasants, workers,
and oppressed minorities would seize power from the ruling
aristocratic and bourgeois classes of Russia.7
As result of this difference, the two groups supported
two

different

immigrants
Party.
and

revolutionary

supported

the

factions

Russian

in

Social

Russia.

The

Democratic

Labor

The Social Democrats were adherents of the economic

political

philosophies

of

Karl

Marx.

Party

included Georgi V. Plekhanov and Vladimir I. Lenin.

members
Between

1885 and 1898, under the umbrella of the Social Democratic
Party, Marxist groups organized and became active in Russia.
These groups supported strikes in Russia's factories.

The

secret police quickly learned of the activities of the Marxist

7 Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet Experiment
1917-1933. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 911; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12-13.
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groups.
Siberia

In 1897, Lenin was arrested and sent into exile in
for

his

political

activity.

When

the

Marxists

convened a secret congress in Minsk in 1898, the secret police
learned of the congress and arrested others in the Marxist
leadership, rendering the Social Democrats inactive.
In 1903, a second Marxist congress convened in London out
of the reach of Tsar Nicholas II's secret police.

At the

congress Lenin took control of the Social Democrats and sought
to restrict the party's membership to a small group of well
indoctrinated Marxists.
the

revolution

This small group would guide and lead

in Russia.

The

leadership

of the

Social

Democrats was to be centrally controlled by this smaller elite
of

Marxist

revolutionaries.

The

orders

authority would be obeyed without debate.
Lenin's

platform which

was

accepted

by

of

the

central

Plekhanov supported
a

small

majority

accept

Lenin's

attending the congress.
The
platform

minority

members

who

refused

to

wanted the party membership to be more open and

objected to Lenin's proposed centralized control of the party.
By the end of the second congress, the Social Democrats had
become irreconcilably split into two groups.

Lenin's group

was known as the Bolsheviks (larger or majority group) and the
minority group was called the Mensheviks (smaller or minority
group).8

8 John Paxton, Companion to Russian History (New York:
Facts on File Publications, 1983), 235-36, 317, 370;
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The second revolutionary group to emerge in Russia was
the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRs) founded in 1902.

The

political philosophies of the SRs combined the ideals of the
Russian populist movement9 with those of Karl Marx.

This

party advocated the socialist style redistribution of the
land, a federal state government, self-determination for nonRussian minorities, freedom of political expression, and the
use of terrorist tactics to achieve its objectives.
1902

and

1905,

the

SRs

carried

out

several

Between
political

assassinations and were considered by the secret police to be
more dangerous than the Social Democrats.

The SRs received

support in the United States from liberal groups such as "The
Friends of Russian Freedom."10
At the same time, official relations between the United
States and Russia remained correct.

The only controversy

arose in 1911 when the Russian government decided to deny
visas to Russian-American Jews who wanted to visit family in
Russia.

The two anti-Tsarist groups lobbied the Congress to

abrogate the Commercial Treaty of 1832 in retaliation for the
Russian government's action.

The resolution to abrogate the

MacKenzie, 389-91.
9 John Paxton wrote that Russian Populists "sought to
transform society by basing it on traditional peasant mir
(community).
Inspired by Michael Bukharin in 1873-74, the
nadrodnik (populists) adopted the tactic of going to the
people (khozhdeniye v narod) with the aim of educating the
masses with revolutionary ideas." Paxton, 322, 371.
10 Paxton, 371, 322; MacKenzie, 388-90.
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treaty passed in the House of Representatives but not in the
Senate where the issue died.11
On the eve of the Great War, the American people and
government as a whole knew very little about Russia and were
apathetic towards the political repression of Tsar Nicholas
II's autocratic government.

George F. Kennan (the younger)

summarized American understanding of Russia and its people
during this period when he wrote:
There was nothing in the traditional American political
philosophy to make Americans aware of such virtues as the
Tsarist system may have had or to cause them to doubt that
the removal of the system would be followed by rapid
progress in the direction of parliamentary democracy. It
had never occurred to most Americans that the political
principles by which they lived might have been
historically conditioned and might not enjoy universal
validity.12
Woodrow Wilson was elected President of the United States
in November 1912.
professor

Prior to entering politics, Wilson was a

of history and political

president of Princeton University.
and

had

written

considered

very

a minor

intellectual

and

little

aspect

science,

a writer and

He was not well-traveled
which

he

of government.13 Wilson was

an

a moralist

about

who

diplomacy,

expected

the

leaders

of

foreign governments to act morally, adhere to international
law

and

meet

international

obligations.

He

was

also

a

11 Filene, 11-14; Paxton, 322, 371; MacKenzie, 388-90.
12 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12.
13 Daniel M. Smith, The Great Departure: The United
States and World War I . (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), 16.
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nationalist who believed that world peace could be achieved
if the nations of the world accepted democracy.

Consequently,

Wilson viewed the autocracies of the world, including Imperial
Russia, as abhorrent.
Wilson did not trust the diplomats and other bureaucrats
of the State Department to negotiate and implement his foreign
policy objectives.
of

state.

Wilson

He considered himself the best secretary
also kept

the

State Department

and

its

ambassadors uninformed about his foreign policy objectives.
During

his

presidency,

Wilson

often

used

special

envoys

instead of State Department personnel to negotiate and head
diplomatic missions.

These special envoys, more often than

not, had no previous diplomatic experience, and did not speak
the language and had never studied the history, culture and
politics of the country to which they were dispatched.

As a

result, they often gave the president a false assessment of
the situation in the country to which they were sent.14
However, an argument can be made that Wilson's special
envoys were no worse than the men who made up the consular and
diplomatic corps of the State Department.
cover

all

incurred.

Salaries did not

of the expenses which diplomats

and counselors

As a result only men from upper middle class and

14 Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 19191939 (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1939; New York:
Harper and Row,
Publishers,
Inc., 1964),
13-14
(page
references are to reprint edition); Kennan, Russia Leaves the
War. 28-29; Smith, 24.
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wealthy

families

Department.

could

to

serve

in

the

State

Many department personnel were alumni of private

and Ivy League schools.
often

afford

retired

Senior members of the department were

financiers,

industrialists,

or politicians.

Most diplomats and counselors received their positions through
political patronage.

As a result the United States embassies

and consulates were staffed by amateurs who learned the art
of diplomacy on the job.15
In addition, the United States missions in Europe were
unprepared to help the thousands of American citizens trying
to leave Europe when the Great War began.
compounded

because

the

embassies

These problems were

and

consulates

were

understaffed and had no provisions to hire more personnel.
American diplomats, as neutrals, were requested to represent
the interests of the belligerent nations and to insure that
prisoners-of-war received adequate care.

In 1914 the Wilson

administration also instructed department personnel to send
reports on the military, political and economic conditions of
the countries in which they were stationed.

The diplomats and

counselors were not trained for this task and the reports
received in Washington were

inaccurate and often delayed.

Most of these problems were not rectified until the passage

15 William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign
Service of the United States: Origins. Development, and
Functions (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1961), 19194.
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of the Foreign Service Act of 1924.16
All of this greatly concerned Robert Lansing, who became
Secretary of State in July 1915.

Lansing was born into a

distinguished New York family and served for twenty-two years
as an international lawyer.

He entered public service in 1914

as the Counselor for the State Department.

Lansing has been

described by historians George F. Kennan and Daniel M. Smith
as a man of keen insight, who was very meticulous and had a
precise legal mind.

He respected and understood international

law and had a great respect for the diplomatic process.

Like

Wilson he believed that nations should be governed by moral
laws; idealism had its place provided it was adapted to common
sense.

Lansing believed that the purpose of diplomacy was to

preserve the

interests of the United States,

and that it

should be conducted carefully and coordinated only through the
State Department.

Wilson's practice of using

special envoys

through the State Department would lead to conflicts between
the president and Lansing.17
The United States Ambassador in Russia during this period
was David R. Francis, the former governor of Missouri, who
received his assignment as a result of political patronage.

16 Isaacson, 141-42.; Mayers, 23-24; Frederick Lewis
Propas, "The State Department, Bureaucratic Politics and
Soviet-Americar. Relations,
1918-1938."
(Ph.
D.
diss.,
University of California Los Angeles, 1982), 2; Barnes, 19194.
17

*

*

Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 28-31, 150; Smith, 18.
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He

was

held

in

low

esteem

by

the

diplomatic

corps

in

Petrograd.18

He knew little about Russia and did not speak

the language.

Like Wilson and Lansing, he had little respect

for the Tsarist government.

When the United States entered

the Great War in 1917, Francis became much more active in his
diplomatic duties.

The ambassador was assisted by two men who

had a great deal of experience in Russia, Maddin Summers,19
the American Consul General in Moscow, and Colonel William V.
Judson,

20

his

military

attache.

trained as Russian specialists,

21

Although

they

were

not

they had a great deal of

service experience and were astute observers of Russia. When

18 Prior to 1914, Petrograd was known as St. Petersburg
and was the capital of Russia. The Tsar's government changed
the name of the city when Germany and Russia went to war. The
Soviet government later changed the name of the city to
Leningrad in honor of Lenin and moved the capital to Moscow.
19 Maddin Summers was the most experienced and respected
American diplomat in Russia in 1917. He was a career diplomat
who was married to a Russian National, Natalie Gorainoff
Summers, a member of the Russian aristocracy.
Like many of
his peers he knew little about Russia when he arrived, but
took advantage of his wife's linguistic capabilities and
liberal social contacts to learn about the political situation
in Russia.
20

•

•

Colonel William V. Judson was the military attache' to
Ambassador Francis.
Like Summers, he was an experienced
Russian observer.
In 1905 during the Russo-Japanese War, he
was a foreign observer attached to the Russian Army.
He
returned to Russia in June 1917.
21

Kennan, Russia Leaves the W ar. 16-17, 35-40; Smith,
137;
Edward M. Bennett, Recognition of Russia: An American
Foreign Policy Dilemma (New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), 15-17.
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one

considers

the

poor

training

of

most

foreign

service

officers in 1917, Francis was fortunate to have them on his
staff.
On 15 March 1917, Tsar Nicholas II was forced to abdicate
due

to

a

revolt

of

Russian

workers

and

soldiers.22

Provisional government took control of Russia.

A

On 17 March,

Francis recommended that the Provisional government, led by
Prince Georgi Y. Lvov, be granted "de facto" recognition.23
Lansing and Wilson approved Francis'

recommendation.

The

United States was the first country to recognize the new
Russian government.24
When a second revolution occurred on 7-8 November 1917,

22 The chief reasons for the March revolution were:
hunger, the enormous casualties inflicted on the Russian army
by the Germans and the inefficiency of the government rigidly
controlled by Tsar Nicholas II and his wife, Alexandra. The
Provisional government formed after the abdication consisted
of the non-socialist parties which made up the Duma (Russian
Parliament). The exception was Alexander Kerensky, a SocialRevolutionary and future leader of the Provisional government.
23 Traditionally the United States granted "de facto"
recognition
to
a
government
which
controlled
the
administrative machinery of state, ruled with the acquiescence
of the people and had the ability and willingness to carry out
and discharge international and conventional obligations of
the state. A "de facto" government can rule with or without
the popular support of the people. Regardless of its popular
support, a "de facto government" is not automatically entitled
to "de facto" recognition.
The criteria for granting "de
facto" recognition varied from country to country.
Black's
Law Dictionary. 5th ed., s.v. "De Facto Government" and
"Government de facto"; Bennett, 12-13.
24 W. Bruce Lincoln, The Romanovs: Autocrats of All the
Russias (New York: The Dial Press, 1981), 713-26; Kennan,
Russia Leaves the War. 13-19; Smith, 18-24; Paxton, 13, 280.
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the United States was both surprised and disapproving.

Why

this occurred and the views which served as the basis for the
administration's reaction to the Bolshevik Revolution is the
subject of George F. Kennan's two volume history,
American Relations.
general,

between

1917-1920.

1917

and

1920

Kennan observed
Wilson's

Sovietthat,

foreign

concerning Russia was confused and uncoordinated.

in

policy
The day

after the Bolsheviks seized power, Lenin announced his "Decree
of Peace."

In his appeal,

soldiers

the

of

belligerent

addressed to the workers
powers,

Lenin

demanded

and
the

immediate opening of peace negotiations and an end to the war
without annexations or indemnities.

Since the appeal was made

directly to the people over the heads of their governments,
Wilson and Lansing believed it constituted direct interference
in the internal affairs of nations.25

Kennan wrote that the

Decree of Peace was:
the first example of demonstrative diplomacy, i.e.
diplomacy designed not to promote freely accepted and
mutually profitable agreements as between governments,
but rather to embarrass other governments and stir up
opposition among their own people.26
On 22 November Lenin took control of the Russian army and
initiated negotiations with Germany which would take Russia
out of the Great War.

After difficult negotiations and a

25

A. A. Gromyko and B. N. Ponomarev, eds., Soviet
Foreign Policy 1917-1945. vol.
1
(Moscow:
Progress
Publishers, 1981), 30-32; Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 7477.
26

Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 75-76.
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major military offensive by the German army, the Bolsheviks
signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on 3 March 1918, and ended
the war on the eastern front.

Wilson and the Allied heads of

state felt betrayed by the treaty, since thousands of German
soldiers were transferred to the western front, prolonging the
war and increasing casualties.27
In addition, Lansing believed that the Bolsheviks were
a serious political threat.

On 4 December 1917, Lansing, with

the consent of the president, issued instructions to Francis
that the United States would not grant "de facto" recognition
to the Bolshevik government.
in

Russia

However,

were

to

have

no

United States representatives
contact

with

the

Bolsheviks.

Francis was instructed to continue his diplomatic

duties in Russia and hold the Bolsheviks responsible for the
safety of the Americans in the country.

Since the United

States had not recognized the Bolshevik government, they were
under no legal obligation to protect American interests in
their country.28
In

January

1918,

Lenin

abolished

the

Constituent

Assembly.

This assembly had been democratically elected just

prior

the

to

Bolshevik

Revolution.

Wilson

and

Lansing

believed that the assembly would rule Russia effectively.
Lenin's actions were used by the administration to justify its

27 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 85-98, 364-77; Smith,
97; MacKenzie, 546-50.
28

•

Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 80-84.
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position that the Bolsheviks did not rule Russia with the
support of the Russian people and to buttress the policy of
non-recognition,

which

would

remain

democratic government took power.

in

effect

until

a

At the same time, both men

retained the hope that by abolishing the assembly, Lenin had
so angered the Russians that they would eventually rise up and
overthrow the Bolsheviks in a counterrevolution.29
That same month, Consular Dewitt C. Poole carried out
several missions which angered the Bolsheviks.
into

the

Ukraine

in

counterrevolutionary

an

used

Poole's

to

and

assess

forces

overthrow the Bolsheviks.
and

effort

actions

make

Poole traveled
contact

their

with

ability

to

The Bolsheviks knew of the mission
to

justify their

case

that the

counterrevolutionary forces in Russia worked for the United
States.30
While

official

representatives

of

the

United

States

conducted various activities in Russia, Wilson also dispatched
special envoys and missions to that country.

These envoys and

missions operated independently and did not report to either
Lansing

or

representatives

Ambassador

Francis.

Wilson's

included the American Red Cross

special
(ARC)

and

Committee on Public Information (CPI), both of which operated
independently in Russia and were responsible for a great deal

29 Ibid., 343-63.
30 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 180-83; Gromyko, 7582.
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of

the

confusion

policies.

concerning

Consequently,

the

the

administration's

representatives

in

Russian
the

two

organizations were resented by the diplomats in Russia.

The

ARC was supposed to carry out humanitarian missions in Russia.
However, between the fall of 1917 and the spring of 1918 two
leaders of the ARC, William Boyce Thompson and Raymond Robins,
were deeply involved in the political affairs of Russia and
the foreign affairs of the United States.

Both men wanted the

Bolsheviks to be granted "de facto" recognition.
The CPI, headquartered in Washington under the direction
of

George

missions

Creel,

to

was

raise

in

Russia

the morale

organization's two principal

during the

carry

out

of the Russian

propaganda
army.

The

officers in Russia, journalists

Arthur Bullard and Edgar Sisson,
intelligence operations.

to

both became involved

in

Bullard had first visited Russia

failed 1905 revolution and was active

in "The

Friends of Russian Freedom" when he returned to the United
States.

In

1917

Bullard

studied

the

Russian

situation and discreetly gave money to the SRs.

political
Though he

reported to Creel independently, he also tried to work with
Francis.

Sisson became involved in intelligence operations

in order to prove Lenin was a German agent.

He returned to

the United States in 1918 with documents which supposedly
proved

this

was

true,

although

Kennan

Sisson's documents were not authentic.

has

written

Creel

that

and Sisson

released the documents to the public in spite of Lansing's
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request

that

they

be

kept

classified

until

all

American

diplomats had left Russia and the documents' authenticity
could be verified.

Creel and Sisson claimed that Wilson

authorized their actions.
provoked

political

The release of the Sisson documents

opposition

in

the

United

States

to

diplomatic relations with the Bolsheviks.31 Wilson's third
special envoy, whom he dispatched to Russia in January 1919,
was William C. Bullitt, a member of the State Department.

He

had come to Wilson's attention a year earlier for his forceful
arguments

against

an

Allied

military

intervention

into

Russia.32 Bullitt went to France with Wilson as a member of
the delegation at the Versailles peace conference.

There

Wilson ordered Lansing to instruct Bullitt to go on a fact
finding

mission

to

Soviet

Russia.

In

addition,

House

instructed Bullitt to tell the Bolsheviks that if they agreed
to an armistice on all fronts, the United States would insist
that the Allies also accept an armistice.

Finally,

House

31 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 45-67.
32 In the spring of 1918, France, Great Britain, Japan
and the United States sent troops into Russia.
Wilson
reluctantly ordered American troops into Russia for three
reasons: 1. To prevent stockpiled war materials in Vladivostok
from being captured by the Germans, or their "supposed" allies
the Bolsheviks.
2. To prevent Japan from occupying Siberia
alone, which Wilson and Lansing believed would only alienate
the Russians further against the Allies and allow Japan to
expand its power in Asia. 3. To allow American troops to aid
the escape of a group of former Czechoslovakian prisonersof-war known as the Czech Legion from Russia.
The military
adventure only lasted until 1920. However, the Soviet Union
continually used the venture to illustrate that the United
States could not be trusted. Smith, 137-152.
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further instructed Bullitt to tell the Bolsheviks that if they
accepted

the proposed

armistice,

the United

States would

resume economic relations with Soviet Russia.33
When Bullitt arrived

in Soviet Russia he was met by

Bolshevik diplomats Georgi Chicherin and Maxim Litvinov.

They

took Bullitt's mission seriously and arranged for him to meet
Lenin.

Bullitt and Lenin agreed that a peace conference

between the Bolsheviks and all of the other "de facto" Russian
factions fighting in the civil war would be convened.
returned to France on 25 March.

Bullitt

However, he never met with

Wilson to discuss the agreements he made with Lenin.

Wilson

decided before Bullitt's return that in order to maintain
unity within the Alliance he would comply with the French and
British governments'
Bolsheviks.

The

desire not to come to terms with the

next

day

Wilson

eventually collapsed on 4 April.

became

very

ill

and

During that period the

president instructed House to confer with Bullitt.

House

informed Bullitt on 6 April, that in order to preserve what
had been agreed to at Versailles the president had decided not
to make peace with the Bolsheviks.

Bullitt then left the

government and became a sharp critic of Wilson, and a lobbyist
for granting "de facto" recognition to Soviet Russia.34

33 John Silverlight, The Victor's Dilemma: The Allied
Intervention in the Russian Civil W ar. New York: Weybright and
Tally, 1970), 156-58.
34 Ibid., 158-69.
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The special missions and envoys confused the Russians as
to who represented the United States in their country.
information collected by the ARC and CPI
passed directly to Wilson.

The

for example was

However, the conclusions of the

reports were often based on inaccurate information and only
served to further exacerbate relations between the Bolshevik
government

and

the

United

States.

This

because information concerning Russia

angered

Lansing

released to the public

more often than not resulted in misunderstandings concerning
United States policy.

Finally, no one knew who represented

the president on foreign policy issues: the State Department
or the special envoys.35
Between 4 December 1917 and 10 August 1920 the Wilson
administration reacted to the situation in Russia in a variety
of

ways.

Despite

the

policy

of

nonrecognition

American

diplomats remained in Russia until 20 September 1920, in the
hope that the Bolsheviks would be overthrown or Lenin would
abandon his communist revolution in Russia, neither of which
occurred.36
Kennan emphasized throughout Soviet American Relations
1917-1920 that misconceptions and ignorance concerning Russia

35

•

•

•

George F. Kennan, Soviet-American Relations. 19171920. vol. 2, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1956), 208-33; Kennan, Russia Leaves the
War. 45-67, 441-57; Gromyko, 79-80.
36 Kennan,

The Decision to Intervene. 467; Smith,

98.
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were "the roots not only of much of the ineffectiveness of
American policy toward the Provisional government but also the
difficulty experienced by many Americans at a

later date

adjusting to the realities of Soviet Power."37 He was critical
of both Wilson and Lenin for being blinded by their respective
ideologies which were based on misconceptions about their
countries.

If

they

had

attempted to

concerning their differences

enter

in 1917-1918,

negotiations

future Soviet-

American relations may not have been so hostile.38
There were two additional reasons why Wilson and Lansing
were unable to implement an effective policy in Russia during
the Bolshevik Revolution.

First, communication between Wilson

and Lansing in Washington and Francis in Petrograd was poor.
The communication equipment of the period was unreliable and
insecure.

Events occurred faster than Francis could report

them and the Wilson administration could respond to them.39
Second, not placing Francis in charge of all United States
government activities in Russia led to a policy which was
ineffective,

indecisive and chaotic.

The Provisional and

Bolshevik governments were never sure who spoke for the United
States or what type of relationship it desired.40

37 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 12.
38

.

Kennan, The Decision to Intervene. 370-72.

39 Kennan, Russia Leaves the W ar. 77-84.
40 Ibid., 45-50, 52-70, 219-41.
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Lansing

attempted

to

deal with

these

problems.

He

believed it was essential to understand the situation that
existed in Russia, and its significance for the future.
1917,

Lansing was

administration

one

to

of

the

consider

few members

the

organization to be taken seriously.

of

Bolsheviks

In

the Wilson
a

political

In preparation for future

communist revolutions he initiated reforms within the State
Department
division
movement.

to

which

resulted

study
Lansing

in

the

Soviet Russia
wanted

the

creation
and

the

of

world

department

to

a

special

communist
lead

the

diplomatic fight against communism in the government.

In

order to defend the policy of non-recognition, communism and
the new Soviet Union had to be studied and understood.41

41 Kennan, Russia Leaves the War. 157; Propas, "The State
Department," 18., Smith, 141.
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Chapter 2
THE RUSSIAN SPECIALISTS

In the last decade of the 19th century the first serious
attempts were made to professionalize the foreign service of
the United States.
divided

into

two

At that time the foreign service was
divisions,

diplomatic

and

counselor.

Counselors were responsible for understanding and reporting
the economic conditions
stationed.

of the countries where they were

The counselor division was not as prestigious as

the diplomatic division and the low salaries of counselors
reflected the disparity.

In addition, counselors could not

advance to the rank of ambassador or minister.

Finally, most

positions were filled via political patronage.

Presidents

Theodore Roosevelt and William H. Taft tried without success
to have positions filled in the foreign service by competitive
examinations.
William J.

Wilson

Bryan,

and

his

first

secretary

of

state,

maintained and practiced the policy

of

appointment by patronage.1
Prior to 1924 there were no specialists in the State
Department.

Nor were there any programs within the foreign

1 Propas, "The State Department," 2, 130-32; Barnes, 19195, 203-05.
26
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service where an aspiring diplomat or counselor could learn
a foreign language or study the customs, history and foreign
affairs of other nations.

Between 1903 and 1913 the State

Department attempted to train a corps of linguists but the
experiment failed because the government would not appropriate
funds that provided for formal courses in foreign languages.
Like the counselors, the linguists received low pay and were
not permitted to advance within the ranks of the department.2
After the Great War, Robert Lansing once again attempted
to professionalize

the

foreign

service.

Lansing was

not

pleased with the performance of the service before, during and
immediately after the Great War, particularly as it concerned
Russia.

Just after the United States entered the war, Lansing

created within the Division of Near Eastern Affairs of the
State Department a special bureau that would focus on the
affairs of Russia.

This bureau was headed by Basil Miles, a

diplomat with previous experience in Russia.
Lansing

ordered

all

foreign

service

After the war

officers

to

begin

gathering information on all political movements around the
world.

He did not want the government to be surprised by

another Bolshevik style revolution.3

2 George W. Baer, ed., A Question of Trust. The Origins
of U.S. - Soviet Diplomatic Relation: The Memoirs of Lov W.
Henderson (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 14042, 166-67; Propas, "The State Department," 95-99.
3 "Division of Eastern European Affairs," The American
Foreign Service Journal (February 1933): 54, report, Robert
F. Kelley Papers, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
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In August

1919,

Lansing made

the

Russian

bureau

an

independent political division within the State Department.
In that same year the United States established the Riga
mission.

At

first

intelligence officers.

the

mission

was

operated

by

Army

One of their missions was to serve as

military liaison officers with the governments of the Baltic
states which were fighting their independence from Russia.
In addition, the Army officers gathered intelligence on the
civil war in Russia,

observing the activities of both the

communist and counterrevolutionary forces.

After the last

American troops left Russia in 1920, the United States did not
have an embassy and consulate in Soviet Russia from which
events in Soviet Russia could be observed.

In order to remedy

this situation the State Department dispatched a commissioner
to the Baltic States, Evan E. Young.

When he arrived in Riga,

Young assumed control of all operations at the Riga mission
and the State Department had a "window" or "outpost" from
which to observe Soviet Russia.4
The first generation of the State Department's Russian
specialists were men who had experience with Imperial Russia.
Most of them did not speak Russian and they did not understand
Bolshevism.

This first generation included Dewitt C. Poole,

(hereafter cited as
Department," 18-19.

Kelley

Papers);

Propas,

"The

State

4 Natalie Grant, "The Russian Section, A Window on the
Soviet Union," The Journal of Diplomatic History 2 (Winter
1978): 109; Baer, 81-84.
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Felix Cole, Arthur Bullard, Montgomery Scuyler and Evan E.
Young.

All of these men served at one time as the chief of

the Russian division.
Samuel

Harper

on

The Russian division also had Professor

its

staff.

Young

recruited

the

second

generation of Russian specialists while he was stationed in
the Baltic provinces between 1918 and 1920.

They included

Robert F. Kelley, Earl Packer and Loy M. Henderson.5
In

his

final

year

as

secretary

of

state,

Lansing

maintained that the best and quickest way to insure that the
Bolsheviks

would

be

forced

from

power

in Russia

continuing to deny them "de facto" recognition.

was

by

At the same

time Lansing and his successors maintained that the United
States

was

opposed

to

any

external

intervention

in

the

internal affairs of Russia.6
In 1920 Lansing's successor, Bainbridge Colby, defined
the conditions for recognition.

Colby made it clear that the

Bolshevik government did not rule Russia with the popular
support of the people.

However, only the Russian people could

remove the Bolsheviks from power.
facto"

recognition

conditions.

the

In order to be granted "de

Bolsheviks

had

to

meet

three

First, they had to stop supporting the subversive

and propaganda activities of the Third International in the

5 Grant, 108-109; Propas,
24; Baer, 83-84, 121-25.

"The State Department," 19-

6 "Policy of the United States Towards Russia," 12, in
Kelley Papers.
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United States.
property

of

Second, they would have to restore the private

American

citizens

seized

by

the

Bolsheviks.

Finally, the Bolshevik government had to pay all debts owed
to the United States by previous Russian governments.

It was

the mission of the Russian Division and the outpost at Riga
to gather evidence in a scholarly manner to support the policy
of non-recognition.

In addition the Russian specialists were

to warn the government when Soviet Russia was prepared to meet
the conditions for recognition.7
A related issue, that of granting "de facto" recognition
to

the

Baltic

states,

secured

the

Russian

specialists'

attention by 1922.8 Poole and the first generation specialists
argued against recognizing the Baltic states because it would
be a violation of the pledge made by Wilson in his "Fourteen
Points" and at Versaille to respect and defend the integrity
of pre-revolutionary Russia's borders.

The first generation

believed that Bolshevik control of the Russian government was
a temporary phenomenon.

If the United States granted the

Baltic states recognition, the Russians would be less inclined

7 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States. 1920. vol. 3 (Washington: GPO, 1936), 436-44,
461-68; The American Foreign Service Journal. 54, in Kelley
Papers; Baer, 140-46; Propas, "The State Department," 21-22.
8 In 1920, when Wilson's term as president expired, three
of the first generation specialists, Harper, Bullard and Davis
left the division.
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to overthrow the Bolshevik government.9
Young and the second generation disagreed with the first
generation's analysis of the political situation in Russia.
The

second generation did not believe that the Bolshevik

government's control of Russia was a temporary phenomenon.
In addition Young, then the United States Commissioner to the
Baltic States, argued that the nationalistic aspirations of
the people of this region were legitimate and that the people
of the Baltic states did not want to be a part of Russia or
a republic within the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
In 1919 and 1920 the Soviet government had recognized the
independence of the Baltic states.

The Baltics had been

granted

"de facto"

Europe.

The Coolidge administration agreed with Young and on

28

July

1922

recognition.

the

recognition by most

Baltic

States

were

of the nations of

granted

"de

facto"

Granting recognition to the Baltic states in

order to maintain the Riga mission was never used by Young in
his arguments.10
After the Great War the United States tried to maintain
an isolationist foreign policy.
was

a great

power,

However, the United States

a position the

assumed with great reluctance.

government and people

Many members of the government

felt that the diplomatic and consular corps of the State

9 Baer, 149-56;
Smith, 137-52;

Propas,

"The

State

Department,"

10 Baer, 149-56; Gromyko, 112-115.
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Department had to be professionalized in order to meet the new
foreign policy challenges which would confront the United
States.

During his last two years in office Lansing had

worked with Congressman John Jacob Rogers, ranking Republican
on

the

House

Foreign Relations

reforms

which

would

Committee,

professionalize

the

to

create

foreign

the

service.

After several attempts, the efforts of Lansing and Rogers were
rewarded when the Foreign Service Act of 1924 (the Rogers Act)
was passed into law.

The law provided four basic reforms:

1.

The adoption of a new and uniform salary scale with
a modest increase in average rate compensation.

2.

An amalgamation of the Diplomatic and Consular
Services into one foreign service on an
interchangeable basis.

3.

Representation allowances for the purpose of
eliminating or at least lessening, the demands on
private means of ambassadors and ministers.

4.

A retirement system based upon the principles of the
Civil Service Retirement and Disability Act of May 22,
1920, but administered entirely separately
therefrom.

Following the passage of the Rogers Act, the counselors
and diplomats became known as foreign service officers (FSOs).
While these reforms were finalized, the department was also
reorganized into six separate political divisions.12

One of

11 Baer, 133.
12 The other five political divisions were the Western
European Division (WED); Division of Far Eastern Affairs
(DFEA); Division of Latin American Affairs (DLAA); Division
of Mexican Affairs (DMA); and Division of Near Eastern Affairs
(DNEA).
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the six divisions was the Division of Eastern European Affairs
(DEEA) which had been created in 1922.

The mission of the

DEEA was the following:
The Division of Eastern European Affairs will have general
supervision, under the secretaries, of matters pertaining
to Russia, (including Siberia), and of relations,
diplomatic and consular, political and economic, with
Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland.
For nine months Poole directed the DEEA. In early 1923
Young was recalled to Washington to head the division.
1923 the four young men he had recruited,
Henderson

and

Department.

Lehrs

become

members

of

Packer,

the

State

Once he assumed his post in Washington, Young

transferred all

three

staffed

with

by

had

Kelley,

By

men

to the DEEA,
a

deeper

to create

knowledge

of

a division

Bolshevism.

However, the second generation of Russian specialists had the
same

mission

as

the

first:

to

defend

the

policy

of

nonrecognition.14
In 1924 the State Department was a small branch of the
government, made up of 620 people of whom only 62 were FSOs.
Under the new reorganization the FSOs would be administered
by the Division of Foreign Service Administration

(DFSA),

which was controlled by Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur
J. Carr.

Carr supported the reforms of the Rogers Act.

Prior

13 "Divisions of Eastern European Affairs," 57, in Kelley
Papers.
14 Baer, 129-31, 156-57; Propas, "The State Department,"
19-20, 32-34; "Division of Eastern European Affairs," 54, in
Kelley Papers.
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to the reforms he served as a civil service officer in charge
of the Consular Service.

Carr as the head of the DFSA decided

where FSOs would be assigned.

He had definite ideas about the

duties of an FSO, believing they were:
the faithful executors of policies made by elected
officials.
But fearing the effects of popular politics
on the stability of international systems, diplomats
viewed themselves as the international policy makers best
able to accommodate the political needs of individual
states to one another.15
Carr

felt

that

specialist

FSOs were

a waste

of

the

limited monetary and personnel resources which the Congress
had allocated to the State Department.

Scholarly reports

required too much time to research and write, time which could
be better used conducting other tasks required of the FSOs.
Worst of all Carr feared the specialists would "politicize the
foreign

service through

involvement with partisan

foreign

policy."16 The second generation Russian specialists and Young
disagreed with Carr's assessment of their worth.

In addition,

the specialist had no control concerning the politicalization
of the DEEA.

Between 1924 and 1933 the Russian specialists

were often instructed to appear before Congress to defend the
policy

of

nonrecognition

by

the Secretary

of

State.

In

addition, their advice was often sought by members of Congress
and the administration on issues concerning Soviet-American

15 Propas, "The State Department," 134.
16 Ibid., 135.
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relations.17
The

four men who were the second generation Russian

specialists came from different backgrounds.
from Utah,
Petrograd

Earl L. Packer,

was stationed at the United States Embassy in
in February

1917 as a member of the Bureau of

Insular Affairs in the War Department.

Once war was declared,

Packer was commissioned as a first lieutenant and made a
military attache'.
observed

the

Throughout the remainder of 1917,

political

situation

in

Russia

without

he
any

preconceptions based on the old tsarist governments.
After Lenin and the Bolsheviks seized power Packer began
to

study

and

gather

intelligence

on

Furthermore he learned to speak Russian.

the

Bolsheviks.

Eventually he was

forced to move with other Americans to Archangel and in 1920
he returned to the United States.
joined the State Department.

He then left the Army and

Because of his background, he

was assigned to the Russian Division.

While stationed in

Washington, he attended night school and received a bachelor's
degree from George Washington University.

In 1922, Packer was

sent to Riga with Young.18
Loy M. Henderson was planning to be a lawyer when the
United

States

entered

the

Great War.

Northwest University in 1915.

He graduated

from

Due to a childhood injury, he

17 Baer, 147-48; Propas, "The State Department," 62-65.
18 Propas, "The State Department," 20; Baer, 124.
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was rejected for service with the Army.

However he joined the

American Red Cross because he wanted to contribute to the war
effort.
ended.

Unfortunately he arrived in Europe after the war
Henderson was a man of deep convictions and believed

in the mission of the Red Cross after the war.

From December

1919 until August 1921, he served in Germany and the Baltic
provinces.

There he worked to repatriate Russian and German

prisoners of war and was

involved

in humanitarian relief

missions during the Russian Civil War. During his work with
anti-Bolshevik Russian soldiers who had returned to the Baltic
provinces, Henderson contracted typhus and almost died.
in the Baltic provinces

in 1920,

While

Henderson met Robert F.

Kelly.
In April

1920,

office in Berlin.
Henderson.

Henderson was transferred to the ARC

There he met Young who was impressed with

Young convinced him to join the foreign service.

Since the United States would become more involved in world
affairs, Henderson took his exams for the service in 1921 and
was accepted into the consular service.

He was posted as a

vice consul in Ireland from 1922 until 1924.

When he returned

to the United States, Henderson once again met Young who was
at this time chief of the DEEA.
into the division.

Young recruited Henderson

Although Henderson did not speak Russian,

he was trained as a Russian specialist.19

19 Baer, 6-9, 61-118.
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Landreth M. Harrison was the third member of the second
generation Russian specialist.
Service in 1927.

Harrison joined the Foreign

Prior to becoming an FSO, he received a

bachelor's and master's degree in political science from the
University of Minnesota.

Between 1923 and 1925 he studied

European languages and international affairs in Paris.

When

Harrison joined the DEEA, he was permitted to study Soviet
Russia independently at the Riga mission.20
The final member of this second generation was Robert F.
Kelley whom historian Daniel Propas referred to as "the most
promising and accomplished of these officers."21

In 1915

Kelley graduated Magna Cum Laude from Harvard University with
a bachelor's degree in European History.
wanted

to

research the

history

of

the

After graduation he
Crimean

War.

In

addition to taking Russian classes at Harvard, he attended the
Paris School of Eastern Languages22 (EIC) at the University
of Paris to improve his Russian. Because of the war he was
unable to go to Petrograd to continue his research so he
returned to Harvard.

He was working on his doctoral degree

at Harvard when the United States entered the Great War.
Kelley joined the Army and received a regular commission.
He served as an instructor at an officer candidate school with

20 Propas, "The State Department," 96-97.
21 Ibid., 33.
22

Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes.
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the 5th Infantry Regiment during the American occupation of
the Rhineland in 1919.

In 1920 Kelley was sent as a military

observer to Riga, Latvia, where he gathered intelligence on
the Bolsheviks during the Russian Civil War.

It was during

this period that Kelley met Henderson and Young.
Like Henderson, Kelley was recruited by Young to join the
foreign service.23 He took the foreign service exam in 1922
and was posted as a consul to India briefly in 1923.

When

Young became head of the DEEA, he requested that Kelley be
transferred to the DEEA despite Carr's objection.

Upon his

arrival in Washington, Young made Kelley the assistant chief
of the division and began to train him as his successor.24
When

Young

was

appointed

Minister

to

the

Dominican

Republic in 1925, he chose Kelley as his replacement.

Kelley

was chief of the DEEA and leading policy maker in SovietAmerican relations until 1933.25 In 1925 Kelley decided that
a corps of Soviet/Russian experts with post graduate training
in Russian language and history was needed, in the words of
DEEA historian Frederick Propas:
to promote the role of experts in the making of foreign
policy; to defend nonrecognition; and to ensure that if

23 From the Commissioner of the United States Riga Evan
E. Young to the Secretary of State, 12 September 1922, no.
2666, in Kelley Papers.
24 Propas, "The State Department," 33, 136-37; Baer, 12223.
25 Baer, 123; Propas "The State Department," 33-39;
"Biographical Sketch of Robert F. Kelley," in Kelley Papers.
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recognition did come, the Soviets would not take unfair
advantage of it.
Except for Kelley, the second generation Soviet experts,
Henderson,

Packer,

and

Harrison,

did

not

training in their area of specialization.

receive

formal

All three became

experts through unstructured on-the-job training at the Riga
mission and the DEEA office in Washington.

To insure that

future Soviet-American policy was conducted effectively Kelley
decided that the third generation of Soviet experts would be
formally trained linguists and Russian historians.27

Kelley

worked with Allen Dulles, the chief of the Division of Near
Eastern Affairs,

to develop programs to train a corps of

career foreign service officers to become linguists and area
experts in their respective divisions.

Both men established

guidelines to insure that FSOs selected for the programs were
adequately paid.

Moreover, they were to be considered for

promotion on the same basis as their peers.

The FSOs selected

for the three year program had to serve an eighteen month
probationary period of training at an embassy or mission in
the country or region of their specialty.

If at the end of

the probationary period their superiors were satisfied with
their work,

they would be sent to school to begin formal

26 Frederick L. Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward
Russia: The Training of the State Department Soviet Experts,
1934-1939," The Journal of Diplomatic History 8 (Summer 1984):
226.
27 Propas,
Baer, 166-67.

"Creating a Hardline Toward Russia,"
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studies.28
On 4 June 1927, the program Kelley and Dulles recommended
was

approved

by

Secretary

of

State

Frank

B.

Kellogg.29

Because the Secretary of State authorized the program,

Loy

Henderson wrote that Carr "was sympathetic to the idea and
agreed to take steps toward the training of a corps of East
European specialists."30
Kelley immediately searched for a university in which the
Soviet specialists could be trained.
universities

located

in

the

United

He rejected several
States,

England

and

Czechoslovakia because he feared that his young FSOs would be
exposed to an academic community which was too sympathetic to
the Soviet Union
nonrecognition.

and therefore hostile to the

policy

of

Kelley finally decided on his Paris alma

mater, the Paris School of Oriental Languages.

The school's

director was Professor Paul Boyer who had taught both Kelley
and Harper prior to the First World War.

Boyer believed that

in order for a student to learn to speak Russian he must
understand Russian history, culture and politics.31

OQ

Propas, "The State Department," 102-106.
29 The policy was formally called "Regulations Governing
the Selections, Training and Promotion of Foreign Service
Officers for Language Assignments in the Near East, in Eastern
Europe, and in North Africa."
They were later embodied in
Executive Order No. 4879 of 8 May 1928. "Division of Eastern
European Affairs," 61, in Kelley Papers.
30 Baer, 167.
31 Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward Russia," 212-19.
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From 1927 until 1936 when the program was terminated,
seven FSOs were trained in Kelley's program.

They were George

F. Kennan (the younger), William M. Gwynn, Norris B. Chapman,
Eric

Kumiholm,

Charles

Francis B. Stevens.
Kennan.

E.

Bohlen,

Edward

Page,

Jr.,

and

All would be trained in Paris except

Pursuant to Kennan's request and because he could

speak German, Kelley permitted him to receive his training in
Berlin at the University of Berlin's Oriental Seminary.32

In

addition to their studies, the student FSOs trained at Riga
and other missions in Europe.33
Overall, the seven men who finished the special program
appreciated it.
to

The first year of the program was dedicated

learning the Russian

language.

The students averaged

thirteen hours a week in the classroom and in some instances
thirty hours outside the classroom learning Russian.

Kelley

discouraged the student FSOs from taking courses concerning
the Soviet Union.

However, reports from Riga were sent to the

school in Paris and studied by the students.
that Kelley wanted him to

Kennan wrote

"get the essentials

of a good

Russian cultural background; the rest will come later.

It was

a wise direction, for which I have always been grateful."34
Kelley wanted the third generation to view the Soviet Union

32 The University of Berlin's Seminary for Orientalische
Sprachen was founded by Bismarck to train German diplomats.
33 Propas, "Creating a Hardline Toward Russia," 220-21.
34 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1930. 33.
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with caution and skepticism based on research and evidence,
not emotion.

Finally, he firmly believed that the new Soviet

specialists should speak Russian and study Russian history and
literature in order to understand the Soviet Union.35
For many years, Kelley's policy was that no FSOs were to
visit the Soviet Union or have contact with Soviet officials.
However,

after

1932

Kelley

felt

that

there

was

a

good

possibility that the United States' recognition of the Soviet
Union was close at hand.

Kelley granted four of the students

in the program, Page, Bohlen, Chipman and Kuniholm permission
to visit the Soviet Union.

The four could go:

under the patronage of the school and the Administration
of the school would pay for their visas, etc. It was not
contemplated that they should enter Russia for any purpose
other than that of obtaining practice in the use of the
Russian language or in any other capacity than that of
student of Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales
Vivantes.36
The students were to travel at their own expense and
avoid publicity.

Kennan was denied permission to go since he

was no longer a student and representative of the government.
Unfortunately the students never made the trip because it was
too

expensive.

Nevertheless,

within

eighteen months

the

35 Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History 1929-1969 (New
York:
W. W. Norton Co., 1973) 8-12, 39-40; Kennan, Memoirs
1925-1930. 31-34; Propas, "Creating a Hardline Towards the
Soviet Union," 216-23.
36 Earl L. Packer to Robert F. Skinner, 5 August 1932,
Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the State Department
in Latvia (Riga), Record Group 84, Russian Book 200, 080(R),
National Archives, Washington D.C.
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policy of nonrecognition had been abandoned and Kennan, Bohlen
and Kuniholm were working in the new American embassy in
Moscow.37
Between 1919 and 1933, Lansing's goal of creating a corps
of professional foreign service officers to defend the United
States' policy with the Soviet Union was fulfilled.

Each

successive generation of Soviet/Russian specialists was more
knowledgeable with respect to the language, history, culture
and

the

activities

of

the

Soviet

government

than

their

predecessor.
Robert F. Kelley was the driving force behind the desire
to develop an understanding of the Soviet Union.

Kennan wrote

of Kelley:
He was a scholar by instinct and dedication. He had built
his division up on scholarly principles to a point where
I am sure there was no geographic division in the
Department of State that had a better knowledge of the
area which it dealt.38
By

1932

members

of

the

third

generation

specialists were serving at the Riga Mission.

of

Soviet

During this

period the quality of the Riga reports improved.

Although

many disagreed with the policy of nonrecognition, the men of
the DEEA were recognized as experts on the Soviet Union.

37 Robert F. Kelley to Edward Page, 3 March 1932, RG 84,
Russian Book 200, 030R-800R; Propas, "The State Department,"
229-34; Bohlen, 16; Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 52-54.
38 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 84.
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Chapter 3
THE RIGA MISSION 1922-1928

By the time Young arrived in Riga in 1920, all United
States missions in Russia had been closed.

Prior to 1922 the

embassies in Paris, Copenhagen, Constantinople and the Riga
mission observed Soviet Russia.

In 1922 the task of studying

Soviet Russia and the international communist organizations
was given solely to the Riga mission.

The other missions

around the world assisted the Riga mission in its efforts.1
Accordingly,

the

State

Department

Russian specialists at the mission.

expanded

the

staff

of

Young wrote that with the

additional staff members it was his intention:
to make the mission a sot of clearing house for the
Department for all information on Russia emanating either
within the so-called Baltic States or within Soviet
Russia.
All aspects of the Soviet Union,3 Communist International
(Comintern), and its subsidiary the Communist Party of the
United States (CPUSA) were studied by the staff.

The

1 Grant, 109.
2 Young to Charles H. Albrecht, Consul, Rival, 31 March
1922, RG 84, Russian Book 18, 000-715.5(R).
3 On 30 December 1922 the RFSFR became the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) or Soviet Union.
44
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through the Comintern.

In return the CPUSA and other member

organizations championed the cause of the Soviet Union and the
world proletarian revolution in their native countries.

The

United States government and the Soviet specialists always
considered

the

activities

of

the

Comintern

to

be

direct

interference in the internal affairs of the United States.4
A cessation of its activities was a necessary precondition
for United States recognition of the Soviet regime.
The Riga mission was divided into two sections.
section handled the traditional roles of a United
mission.

This

included

everything

from

the

One
States

day-to-day

diplomacy with the Baltic States governments to the issuing
of passports.

The second section, called the Russian section,

observed the Soviet Union.

The Russian section was unique in

the annals of the State Department since its personnel studied
a government which was not recognized by the United States.
In 1923 Young returned to the DEEA in Washington.

He was

replaced by F. W. B. Coleman a political appointee.

Coleman

remained at the post of United States Minister to Latvia for
nine years and remained supportive of the objectives of the

4 F. W. B. Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 January
1926, Record Group 59, 861.00B/376/3522; "The American Foreign
Service Journal," 59, in Kelley Papers; Baer, 161-63; John
Lowenhardt, The Soviet Politburo, trans. Dymphna Clark (New
York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1982), 24-25; Propas, "The
State Department," 73.
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Riga mission.5
In addition to the Russian specialist FSOs, the Russian
section

of

the

mission

employed

translators and intelligence agents.

foreigners

as

clerks,

Most of these men and

women were born in Russia or the Baltic States.

Four of the

people who served in these positions were M. C. Perts, Sergius
Riis, Natalie Grant and David A. Lehrs.
intelligence agents.

Perts and Riis were

The State Department provided funds to

support their activities.

Their intelligence sources included

members of the Soviet government, Soviet citizens, visitors
to

the

Soviet

Union

and

intelligence

agents

from

other

European countries.6 However, information derived from these
"human intelligence" sources were only a small part of the
evidence

gathered

by

the

mission's

officers.

The

vast

majority of the material came from printed sources.7
David A. Lehrs and Natalie Grant served as clerks and
translators at the mission.

Lehrs was an American citizen

born in Russia who could speak and write Russian and German
fluently.
1919

as

He worked for the State Department in the fall of
the

translator

for

the

first

United

States

5 Grant, 109-11; Propas, "The State Department," 73, 142.
6 In the Riga reports examined for this thesis, the names
of Soviet officials and citizens providing information to the
Riga mission were never revealed.
The writer of the report
usually identified them as IS/1, IS / 2 , IS/3 or IS/4.
After
1928, references to these individuals did not appear on any
of the reports from Riga.
7 Baer, 162-63; Propas, "The State Department," 81.
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Commissioner to the Baltic States,
through

1923

Lehrs

was

a

member

John Gade.
of

the

From 1921

American

Relief

Administration (ARA), a private organization which provided
famine

relief

to

Soviet

Russia.

The

State

Department

attempted to use the ARA officers to gather information on the
Soviet Union.

Because most of them could not speak Russian,

this attempt failed.

Furthermore, Soviet officials limited

their contact with the people and restricted their activities
to famine relief in the countryside.

However, Lehrs was able

to send Young a large supply of Soviet publications which
greatly enhanced the ability of the specialists to understand
the Soviet Union.

After he left the ARA, Lehrs joined the

staff at Riga as a translator.8
Natalie Grant was born in 1901 in Estonia which was then
a part of Imperial Russia.

She studied at the University of

Rostov and was employed by the United States as a translator
for the ARA.
employed

by

After her service with the ARA,
the

State

Department.

She

worked

Grant was
for

the

department for thirty five years and eventually became a staff
officer and American citizen.

She worked at the Riga Mission

from 1924 until 1939 as a bookkeeper and translator.9
As stated previously,

the Russian specialists at Riga

8 John A. Lehrs to Young, 13 March 1922, RG 84, Book 18,
000-715.5(R); Grant, 108-109; Baer, 63, 66, 172, 174, 184;
Propas, "The State Department," 80.
9 U.S. Department of State, The Biographic Register 1958
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1958), 264; Grant, 108-09.
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acquired the vast majority of the evidence used in their
reports from published sources.
1919 until

it closed

purchase almost

in 1939,

From the time it opened in
the Riga Mission tried to

every publication produced

government and the Comintern.

by

the

Soviet

Armed with the publications

obtained by the Russian section in Riga, the DEEA studied the
Soviet Union in a scholarly manner and successfully defended
the policy of nonrecognition.

Henderson wrote that:

The legation . . . had been successful in acquiring for
its library and for that of the Eastern European Division
a mass of Soviet books, pamphlets, newspapers, and other
periodicals that was almost without parallel outside the
Soviet Union. Both libraries, for instance, had complete
sets of Soviet laws and decrees as well as numerous legal
treaties, most issues of Izvestia and Pravda dating back
to the early days of the Bolsheviks revolution, and files
of other newspapers published in Moscow, Leningrad, and
the capitals of many of the constituent republics of the
Soviet Union.
The mission attempted to acquire books directly from the
state

controlled

publisher

Mezhdunarodnaya

Kniga

(International Book) and subscribed to fifty different Soviet
newspapers

and

periodicals.

These

publications

usually

reached the mission within thirty-six hours of publication and
were translated and analyzed by the staff and then compiled
into a report.

The

politics to culture.

subjects of the reports ranged

from

On occasion, a report was written in

response to a specific inquiry from the State Department.

The

original

and

report,

the

actual

primary

source

material

10 Baer, 162.
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translation of the material, was then transmitted to the DEEA
in Washington.

A copy of the report with enclosures was then

"put into neat volumes by an expert Riga bookbinder - a member
of a guild that went back to Hanseatic days."11

Each volume

consisted of approximately 600 typewritten pages.12

A second

copy of many of the reports was sent to the Ecole Nationale
des Lanques Orientales Vivantes (EIC) in Paris to be used by
the Russian scholars of that university.

Beginning in 1928,

the third generation Russian specialists studied the reports
during their stay at the university.
in Washington were read,
library.13
Department
1933),

There
to

the

defend

The originals received

analyzed and placed in the DEEA
reports

the

were

used

by

the

policy of nonrecognition

State
(1922-

or to prepare for diplomatic negotiations with the

Soviet government (1933-1937).14
Most of the reports written between 1922 and 1928 were
simple chronological accounts or monographs of the activities
of the

Soviet government,

Bolsheviks

the Russian Communist Party of

and the Comintern.

Natalie Grant wrote that this

11 Baer, 191.
12

These bound volumes are now located in Record Group
84,
Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department
of State (Riga, Latvia) at the National Archives.
13 These reports are located in Record Group 59, General
Records of the Department of State at the National Archives.
14 Baer, 160-65, 191; Grant, 109-112; Propas, "The State
Department," 81-91.
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was an introductory period and "the views expressed by the
personnel

were

not

uniformly

precedent over analysis."15
the

Americans

at

Riga

objective,

and

facts

took

Analysis was difficult because

were

studying

the

world's

first

communist state which did not act in a traditional manner.
The early reports therefore tended to detail the operation and
the structure of the Soviet government, Comintern and RCP(B).
When the civil war ended, the Bolsheviks had firm control
of the urban areas of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist
Republic (RSFSR).
population

lived

However, only fifteen percent of Russia's
in the

cities.16

The

vast majority

of

Russians were peasants who lived in the country and resisted
the efforts of the Soviet government to force them to live on
collective farms or "kolkhoz."17

The collective farms were

inefficiently managed by the RCP(B)

and the peasants were

forced

prices

to

sell

their

produce

at

fixed

by

the

15 Grant, 111.
16 One Soviet source estimated 100 million Russians out
of a total population of 130 million lived in the rural areas
of the country.
V. Lelchuk, Y. Polyckov, A. Protopopov, A
Short History of Soviet Society, trans. Katharine Judelson and
Anatoly Bratov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), 101; "The
Organization of the So-Called Russian Soviet Government" by
Captain Robert F. Kelley, USA, with a cover message, Evan E.
Young to Secretary of State, 13 September 1922, 2666, in
Kelley Papers.
17 Soviet collective farms were called "kolkhoz" as a
Russian abbreviation for "collective economy." In theory, a
collective farm was a cooperative of a number of peasants who
pool land and equipment and were paid according to the amount
of work performed. The collective farms were managed by the
RCP(B) members. Paxton, 211.
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government.

In order to take control

of their

peasants revolted against the Soviet government.
destroyed

their

successfully
authority.

crops,

fought

the

did

not

Red Army

pay
sent

They hid or

their
to

land the

taxes

enforce

and

Soviet

As a result of the peasant revolt the Soviet

government could not feed the workers in the cities.

The

workers provided the political base which allowed the Soviet
government to rule Russia.
also

began

to

government.

As the workers became hungry they

challenge

the

authority

of

the

Soviet

The most serious challenge to the Bolsheviks

occurred on 7-18 March 1921 when the sailors at the Russian
naval base at Kronstadt, near Petrograd, mutinied.18 Lenin and
Trotsky used the Red Army to suppress the revolt.
realized that if the RCP(B)

Lenin

was to maintain power in the

Soviet Russia political reforms were needed.

The new reforms

were called the New Economic Policy (NEP).19
The specialists of the Riga mission studied the reforms
instituted
interest.
a

state

by

the

Soviet

government

under

the

NEP

with

They informed Washington that the Soviets were in
of

transition:

"From

a

state

governed

by

the

revolutionary conscience of the proletariate, Soviet Russia

18 Soviet historians write that the Kronstadt sailors
were led by "counter-revolutionaries and white guards."
Western historians write that the sailors revolted because
they wanted a more democratic socialist form of government and
an end to the policy of war communism.
Lelchuk, 99;
Mackenzie, 477-78.
19 Lelchuk, 98-99; Mackenzie, 476-78.
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•

,

is to be transformed into a state governed by law."

20

The

specialists also noted the concessions made by Lenin under the
NEP to the workers and the peasants.

Under the NEP, Lenin

gave greater economic latitude to the peasants and small urban
entrepreneurs while at the same time he insured that all
political power remained in the hands of the RCP(B).

The

attempts to force the peasants to accept the kolkhoz were
abandoned.

The right of private property was established and

Russian citizens were permitted:
to organize industrial and commercial establishments, and
carry on trade occupations, provided they observe the rule
of regulation and protection of labor in Soviet Russia.21
The people were no longer governed by the arbitrary laws of
the

local

soviets.

A

national

judicial

authority

was

established.22
The political nature of the regime occupied the Riga
specialists as well.

On 10 July 1918 the 5th Congress of

Soviets adopted the Soviet Constitution which provided that
the supreme power of the RFSFR be held by the All-Congress of
Soviets which met annually for five to seven days.

However,

the Riga specialists reported that the real power
government

lay

within

the

All

Russian

Central

of the

Executive

Committee (the Central Committee), the Organizational Bureau

20

Harold B. Quarton to Secretary of State, 31 July 1922,
2395, in Kelley Papers.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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(Ogoburo) and the Political Bureau (Politburo).

The Ogoburo

and Politburo were collectively known as the Presidium.
All-Congress of Soviets elected the Executive Committee.

The
In

1921, it consisted of 386 full members and 125 candidates or
alternate members.

The Central Committee elected the members

of

within

the

Presidium

responsible

for

its

government

ranks.

party

The

Ogoburo

administration.23

was
The

Politburo, headed by Lenin, was responsible for the day-today

operations

of

the

government

authority in the Soviet Union.24

and

was

the

ultimate

While stationed at Riga,

Kelley correctly observed that, "The political bureau may be
regarded as the supreme directing force in the communist party
and the Soviet Government."

He also noted that the members

of the Politburo held the leading positions in the Central
Committee of the RCP(B).

He further noted that the Soviet

constitution was written to insure that the RCP(B) maintained
political power in Russia.
The Riga reports indicated that while the RCP(B)
retreated

from

the

policy

of

war

communism

they

had

firmly

23 In 1921 the full or voting members of the Ogoburo
consisted of Joseph V. Stalin, Aleksey I. Rykov, Michael P.
Tomsky, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, and Komarov. The candidate or
advisory members were Michael I. Kalinin, Yemelyan M.
Yaroslavsky,
Ivan I.
Dzerz insky and Y.
E.
Rudzutak.
Lowenhardt, 18.
24

The full members of the Politburo in 1921 were Lenin,
Lev Trotsky, Joseph V. Stalin, Lev B. Kamenev and Grigory Y.
Zinoviev.
Nicholas I. Bukharin, Michael I. Kalinin and
Vyacheslav M. Molotov were alternate members. Lowenhardt, 18.
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believed that the NEP was a necessary but temporary retreat
from the creation of a strict socialist nation.
from Riga that,

Kelley wrote

"it has been under the Bolsheviks that the

belief in the Soviet system has become sort of a new religion
whose believers see in the Soviet Republic a new type of State
which opens to the masses the possibility of taking an active
part in the upbuilding of society."25
In 1921 and 1922 peasants who owned their farms still
made up the bulk of the Soviet Union's population.
with

They along

small businessmen were not considered workers.

The

RCP(B) believed that these Russians posed the greatest threat
to their political authority.
wrote the
successful

As a result the communists

Soviet Union's constitution to
peasant

farmers

called

"Kulaks"

insure that the
and

the

small

businessmen classified as members of the bourgeois could not
obtain political power.
The Soviet constitution divided political boundaries by
economic class, not geographic location.

Under Article 23 of

the constitution the Soviet government could deprive Russians
not classified as workers of the right to participate
elections.
RCP(B)

The

in

indirect methods of election used by the

insured that political power remained in the cities

where the communists enjoyed popular support.

The RCP(B)

25 "The Organization of the So-Called Russian Soviet
Government" by Captain Robert F. Kelley, USA, with a cover
message, Evan E. Young to Secretary of State, 13 September
1922, 2666, in Kelley Papers.
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approved all
ballot

was

lists of acceptable candidates.
not

used

in

elections

and

the

The secret
communists

intimidated voters to support the RCP(B) candidates.

Members

of the RCP(B) elected from the cities where the communists had
political power were also allowed to hold positions in the
rural districts where the city was
efforts

of the RCP(B)

to keep

located.

non-communists

Despite the
out of the

governments, the peasants of rural Russia elected 102 non
communist members
Congress

of

out of

Soviets

1611 members to the All-Russian

in 1921.

Kelley concluded that the

superior organizational skills, dedication and discipline of
the communists would insure that the RCP(B) would maintain
power in Russia for a long time.26
In May 1922 Lenin suffered the first of a series of
strokes that would eventually kill him.

During this period

he became less active in the day-to-day operations of the
Soviet

government

and

the

Soviet

Union

was

ruled

by

a

triumvirate or "troika" led by Joseph Stalin, Gregory Zinoviev
and Lev B. Kamenev.

Lenin died on 21 January 1924.

In May,

on

13th Party

RCP(B),

the

eve

of

the

Conference

of

the

Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, Lenin's widow, presented the party with
two letters he had written in December 1923 and early January
1924.

The letters known as "Lenin's Last Testament" were very

critical of the Stalin-Kamenev-Zinoviev troika.

The letters

26 Ibid.
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in which Lenin was most critical of Stalin were first read to
the Central Committee, of which Krupskaya was a full member.
In the letters, Lenin warned that Stalin had too much power
in the RCP(B) ; he was a full member of the Politburo, Ogoburo,
Central Committee and the Comintern.
Ogoburo,

As the head of the

Stalin expanded the size of the

bureaucracies and the Central Committee.

local

communist

He filled these new

positions with men who were personally loyal to him.

Lenin,

in his letters cautioned the party membership that in time
Stalin could abuse his power.

Stalin in his own defense

claimed that he only wanted to revitalize the RCP(B) and to
make the party more popular with the masses.27 After the
letters were read, the Central Committee voted 30 to 10 to
allow the three members
positions.

of the Troika

to maintain

their

Furthermore they agreed not to read the letters

before the party congress.28
This occurred because with Lenin's death,

the Soviet

government and RCP(B) were divided into four factions.
first

was

consisted

made
of

up

of

Stalin's

Bukharin's

Right

supporters.
Opposition.

The

The

second

The

Right

Opposition wanted to maintain the policies of the NEP and to
build the Soviet Union through a policy of cooperation with
noncommunist Russians and the capitalist nations.

The third

27 Mackenzie, 480-84; Lowenhardt, 21-22.
28

Mackenzie, 482; Lowenhardt, 23-25; Paxton, 233, 341.
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faction was Trotsky's Left Opposition.

The Left Opposition

believed that the RCP(B) had an obligation to move the Soviet
Union rapidly towards socialism and to actively support the
proletarian world revolution.

The last group was

led by

Zinoviev and Kamenev and their supporters in Petrograd.
Trotsky and Bukharin attempted to use Lenin's criticisms
of Stalin to remove him from power.
Zinoviev and Kamenev,

was

Stalin, with the aid of

able to parry their challenge.

Between 1924 and 1926 Stalin continued to consolidate his
power by supporting the Right Opposition against the Left
Opposition.

At the same time, he continued to expand the size

of the RCP(B) and the Central Committee,29 but did not alter
the size of the Politburo.

In 1925 Zinoviev and Kamenev began

to withdraw support from Stalin.

That same year, Stalin began

to advocate a new policy where the first priority of the
government and the RCP(B) was to build socialism in the Soviet
Union.

Since world proletarian revolution was not imminent,

Stalin wanted to build the Soviet Union into a major socialist
economic and military power.
RCP(B)

Once this was accomplished, the

would be in a better position to support the world

revolution when it occurred.

Under this policy Stalin wanted

members of the Comintern to abandon their quest for political
power in their native lands in favor of building socialism in

29 In 1921 the Central Committee consisted of 57 full and
candidate members. In 1924 the committees membership had been
expanded to a total of 139 members. Lowenhardt, 25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

58

the Soviet Union.

To accomplish this, he demanded that the

Comintern strictly follow the instructions of the RCP(B).
Stalin

claimed

that

his

policies

were

in

line with

the

political philosophies espoused by Lenin.
The Left Opposition opposed Stalin's plan as did Zinoviev
and Kamenev.

In 1926 with the aid of his communist loyalists

and the Right Opposition,

Stalin had Kamenev,

Zinoviev expelled from the Politburo.
loyal

Stalinists,

Kalinin.

Vyacheslav

M.

Trotsky and

They were replaced by

Molotov

and

Michael

I.

In 1928 Stalin moved against the Right Opposition

and had Trotsky expelled from the communist party.

Through

these actions, Stalin had built a government and a party which
was personally loyal to him.

Once this was accomplished,

Stalin turned on the peasants and brutally forced them to
accept the "kolkhoz."
the

Soviet

Union

and

By 1929 Stalin was in firm control of
its

chief

international

organ,

the

Comintern.30
The Russian specialists accurately recorded Stalin's rise
in the Soviet government.

However, they did not analyze how

he used the Ogoburo to build a base of political support but
only noted that each year the government and the RCP(B) became
more totalitarian.31 An accurate account of the leaders of the

30 MacKenzie, 484-90; Lowenhardt, 25-28.
31 F. W. B. Coleman to Secretary of State, 5 April 1924,
RG 59, 861.00B/180/1874; Coleman to Secretary of State, 27
August 1924, RG 59, 861.00B/229/152.
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Soviet

Union

was

maintained

and

reported

to

the

DEEA.

Furthermore, it was noted that each year the RCP(B) attempted
to increase its political support among the country's rural
peasants.

Beginning in 1926 the specialists recorded Stalin's

move to assume full control of the Soviet government with the
expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Politburo.32
As the programs,

policies and standards of the DEEA

improved, so did the quality of the Riga reports.33 In 1927
Louis Sussdorff, Jr. became the charge d
Mission.

affairs of the Riga

After he arrived the new policies and standards were

implemented and the reports began to contain more analyses.
A wide variety of subjects ranging from economics to politics;
domestic and foreign policies; science and technology; and the
armed forces were addressed in the reports.
Stalin's
reported.

implementation

of

forced

For example

collectivization

was

The specialists reported that the Red Army was

indoctrinated and used to enforce the policy.

Finally, they

noted that with the implementation of collectivization, and
the expulsion of Trotsky, Kamenev and Zinoviev from positions
of authority within the government,
Soviet Union towards socialism.

Stalin was moving the

The specialists believed the

32 Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 July 1925, RG 59,
861.00B/322/2998; Coleman to Secretary of State, 5 August
1925, RG 59, 861.00B/336/3080; Coleman to Secretary of State,
14 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/376/3522; Coleman to Secretary
of State, 5 February 1926, RG 59, 861.00B/379/3566.
33 Propas, "The State Department," 83.
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dictatorship of the proletariate led by Stalin would remain
<% «

in control of the Soviet Union for an indefinite period.
With these supports to sustain them, between 1922 and
1928 the Russian/Soviet specialists at Riga and the DEEA in
Washington successfully defended the policy of nonrecognition.
The first challenge occurred in 1922 when Lenin sent George
Chicherin, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the meeting
of the Supreme Allied Council in Cannes, France and the Genoa
Conference.

Lenin

realized

that

devastated after seven years of war.

the

Soviet

Union

was

Furthermore, both Europe

and the United States had recovered economically from the
Great War thus indefinitely postponing the inevitable world
proletarian revolution.

Lenin wanted diplomatic relations

with the capitalist nations, especially Great Britain and the
United States.

What Lenin wanted most from the two nations

were loans and technical assistance.

These were necessary to

convert the Soviet Union from an agricultural to an industrial
nation.

Until

the proletarian

revolution

occurred Lenin

stated that the Soviet Union would be guided by a policy of
peaceful

coexistence

with

the

capitalist

nations

as

34 Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 April 1925, RG 59,
861.00B/315; Louis Sussdorff, Jr. to Secretary of State, 5
January 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/31/5807; Sussdorff to Secretary
of State, 19 October 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/29/5626; Sussdorff
to Secretary of State, 26 October 1928, RG 59, 861.00B/5652;
Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 19 November 1928, RG 59,
861.00B/5703; Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 22 November
1928, RG 59, 861.00B/5722.
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Chicherin's

international

role

indicated.35

The

European

governments endorsed the policy of peaceful coexistence.

In

1922 for example, the Treaty of Rapallo was signed between
Germany and the Soviet Union.

In the treaty Germany opened

diplomatic relations with the Soviet government.

These events

marked the beginning of the end of the diplomatic isolation
of the Soviet Union.36
The Riga specialists

sent reports to

the DEEA which

outlined these goals of Soviet foreign policy.
specialists

noted

that the

Soviets

country's diplomatic isolation.

wanted to

Second,

First, the
end their

the Soviet Union

would avoid a war with a capitalist nation (s) until their
armed forces were strengthened.

Finally, the Soviet diplomats

would encourage international rivalries between the capitalist
nations.

These policies would allow the Soviet government to

maintain

its

formation

of

image as
an

a peaceful

alliance

between

nation
the

and prevent

capitalist

the

nations

against the Soviet Union.37
However,

establishment

States involved more steps.

of

relations

with

the

United

The Soviet government knew that

35 H. Percival Dodge to Secretary of State,
1924, RG 59, 861.00B/231/2434; MacKenzie, 550-51.

30 August

36 MacKenzie, 550.
37 Dodge to Secretary of State,
861.00B/231/2434.

30 August 1924, RG 59,
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in order to be granted "de facto"38 recognition by the United
States, pre-war debts had to be paid and subversive activities
by the Comintern in the United States had to cease.

The

Soviet government challenged the issue of paying the debts of
previous

Russian

governments

by

claiming

that the

United

States must pay for property destroyed or damaged by the
American

troops

during

the

1918-1920

intervention.

Coincidentally the damage estimates amounted to a little more
than the debts claimed by the United States.39 Their approach
concerning the Comintern was tangled.

Due to the reports and

evidence collected by the Riga mission, the Soviet officials
were forced to lie about the Comintern's role as a subversive
organ

of their government.

On

11 January

1924,

Coleman

reported that the Soviet government was aware of the Riga
Mission and instructed its diplomats to tell the public that

38 The DEEA was concerned how the Congress and
international community would interpret the presence of both
American and Soviet diplomats at international conferences.
The major question to be answered was: If the United States
and the Soviet Union signed an international agreement
jointly, did this constitute "de facto" recognition on the
part of the United States? The diplomats at the DEEA said no.
However, at all future conferences attended by the United
States and the Soviet Union, American diplomats inserted a
reservation clause in all documents jointly signed by the two
nations.
The reservation stipulated that acceptance of the
agreement by both countries did constitute the granting of "de
facto" recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States.
Baer,
160-61;
Propas,
"The
State Department,"
44-51;
MacKenzie, 550.
39 MacKenzie, 550.
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the documents collected by the mission were forgeries.40
However, the specialists at Riga were able to prove that
the chief of the Comintern, Zinoviev, was also a member of the
Politburo.

Zinoviev was not the only member of the Soviet

government who was both a member of the Politburo and the
Comintern.

Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev and Stalin were all

members of the Comintern's leadership.41

The mission also

collected documents which contained instructions and guidance
from the RCP(B) and the Soviet Government to the Comintern.
For example, communist parties that were part of the Comintern
were instructed by the Soviet government not to alienate the
workers in their country.

Each communist party was to base

its tactics on the unique political,
condition of their country.

economic and social

The ultimate objective of every

member party of the Comintern was to be prepared to seize
power under the direct orders of the RCP(B) when conditions
were correct for the world proletarian revolution.
from

Moscow

were

to

be

obeyed

with

Orders

"unquestioning

obedience.1,42

40 Coleman to Secretary of State, 11 January 1924, RG 59,
861.00B/1746; Gromyko, 216.
41 Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 July 1925, RG 59,
861.00B/322/2998; Coleman to Secretary of State, 16 July 1924,
RG 59, 861.00B/213.
42 Robert W. Bliss to Secretary of State, 3 March 1924,
RG 59, 861.00B/173/144; Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 March
1924, RG 59, 861.00B/186/1871; Coleman to Secretary of State,
20 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/289/2642; Coleman to Secretary
of State, 24 January 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/292/2650; Coleman
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In addition, the United States learned from the Russian
specialists and the DEEA how the Soviet government financed
and

controlled

the

Comintern

and

how

the

RCP(B)

moved

propaganda materials overseas. The Soviet trade delegations
in the United States, were instructed to maintain contact with
the CPUSA and its subsidiary organizations.43 The specialists
at Riga obtained from Soviet newspaper articles the names of
Americans who were active in the Comintern and reported that
the Soviet government followed the activities of the CPUSA
with interest.44 During the 1920's it was noted by the Soviet
government that the CPUSA had very little support from the
workers of the United States.
recommended

that

the

CPUSA

The RCP(B) and the Comintern
increase

party

membership

providing financial assistance to unemployed workers,
farmers

and

African-Americans

who

were

victims

by

poor
of

institutional racial segregation in many parts of the United
States.45
to Secretary of State, 18 March 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/299/1018.
43 Coleman to Secretary of State, 17 January 1924, RG 59,
861.00B/160; Charles L. Kasey to Secretary of State, 9
February 1924, RG 59, 861.00B; Coleman to Secretary of State,
8 March 1924, RG 59; 861.00B/170F; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 8 October 1924, RG 59, 861.00B/324/2831; Coleman to
Secretary of State, 23 November 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/365/3386.
44 Dodge to Secretary of State, 14 March 1924, RG 59,
861.00B/174/2232; Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 May 1925,
RG 59, 861.00B/324/2831.
45 Coleman to Secretary of State, 12 October 1924, RG 59,
861.00B/358/3267, J.C. White to Secretary of State, 20 August
1925, RG 59, 861.00B/342/3129; White to Secretary of State,
3 September 1925, RG 59, 861.00B/349/3174.
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The Soviet specialists did not agree on how Stalin's rise
to power would affect the relationship between the Soviet
Union and the Comintern.

Russian specialists David MacGowan

and Lehrs believed that the expulsion of Trotsky and Kamenev
from the Politburo indicated “a mortal blow" to the Comintern.
Coleman believed the opposite was true based on information
provided

by

American

intelligence

sources

and

Latvian

intelligence officers. Soviet periodicals stated that in 1926
the Soviet government had committed financial resources to the
Comintern.

As a result, Coleman concluded that the Comintern

was subservient to the Soviet government and was still under
Stalin's strict control.

He wrote:

When proof was available that the Soviet Government has
ceased to allot funds for this purpose, then, and only
then, will one be justified in believing that Russia has
turned the corner in her international relations.
As

this

chapter has

shown,

the Riga reports written

between 1922 and 1928 were in large part factual accounts of
the

activities

Comintern.

of

the

However,

Soviet

Natalie

government,
Grant's

RCP(B)

contention

and

the

that

the

reports written during this period contained little analysis
was accurate.47 Yet the reports served their purpose.
1923,

Hughes argued against granting the Soviet Union

facto" recognition for economic reasons.

In
"de

Hughes admitted that

46 Coleman to Secretary of State, 28 January 1926, RG 59,
861.00B/378/3545.
47 Grant, 111.
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trade with the Soviet Union would benefit the United States
but noted that the countries's principles were not for sale.
However, American citizens were free to conduct business in
the Soviet Union at their own risk.48
In that same year Senator William E. Borah, chairman of
the

Senate

Foreign Relations

Committee,

held

hearings

in

attempt to have legislation passed which granted the Soviet
Union "de facto" recognition.
before

Borah's

nonrecognition.

committee

Hughes sent Young and Kelley
to

defend

the

policy

of

Young in turn left it to Kelley to speak for

the administration.

Armed with evidence collected by the Riga

Mission and his own experiences, Kelley clearly demonstrated
that the Soviet Union had not met the conditions established
by the United States for recognition.

Borah then asked Kelley

specifically why the United States should not grant the Soviet
Union "de facto" recognition.
the

United

States

diplomatic relations.
to

international

could

If they violated the agreement,

withdraw

recognition

or

sever

Kelley told the senator that according

law and domestic courts once

"de facto"

recognition was granted, it could not be taken away, even if
there was a legitimate grievance between the two nations.

Due

in large part to Kelley's testimony, the committee voted to
continue

the

policy

of

nonrecognition.

The

testimony

established Kelley's reputation as the department's foremost

48 Baer, 147-48; "Policy of the United States Towards
Soviet Russia," in Kelley Papers.
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expert on Soviet Russia.
concerning

Kelley was the government's guide

Soviet-American

relations

and

the

policy

of

nonrecognition until 1933.49
The reports from this period, therefore provided partial
evidence

to

defend

the

policy

of

nonrecognition

by

demonstrating the Soviet's noncompliance with conditions for
recognition.

In addition, the Riga FSO's proved that the

Comintern was a subversive organ of the RCP(B) and the Soviet
Union.

They

strengthened

the

belief

that

the

Soviet

government's support of the Comintern and its subsidiary, the
CPUSA, was interference in the internal affairs of the United
States.

By contrast the reports provided little information

regarding the Soviet Union's ability to pay the pre-war debts
of previous Russian governments.

49 Baer, 123, 145-49; Propas, "The State Department," 3339.
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Chapter 4
THE RIGA MISSION REPORTS 1929-1933

Beginning in 1929, the reports written by the specialists
at Riga evolved from simple chronologies to more scholarly
analyses of the Soviet Union and the Comintern.

The reason

for the improved quality of the reports was due partially to
the large library collected on the Soviet Union.

In addition,

the staff now had an excellent corps of FSOs, many of whom had
studied the Soviet Union for seven years.1 In that same year,
as Loy M. Henderson wrote, two significant events occurred in
the United States and the Soviet Union.

In October, the Great

Depression began in the United States.

One month later in the

Soviet Union, Stalin became the supreme ruler.2
The Soviet specialists watched with great interest as
Stalin consolidated his power.

By 1929 they determined that

the Comintern and its major subsidiary organizations such as
the Red International of

1 Grant, 112-114;
Department," 74-75.

Labor Unions

Baer,

179-81;

(Profintern)3 were

Propas,

"The

State

2 Baer, 186-87.
3 The Profintern, subordinate to the Comintern, was
created in 1919 at the same time that the Comintern was
created.
68
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under the direction of the Soviet government and the AllUnion Communist Parties of Bolsheviks or AUCP(B) .4 By the end
of 1929, all four organizations were controlled by Joseph V.
Stalin.5
As the Riga mission noted Stalin's rise to power during
the first ten months of 1929 was not easy.

First he had to

"purge" from the AUCP(B) the members of the Right Opposition
led by Nicholas I. Bukharin, who opposed Stalin's five-year
plan to rapidly industrialize the Soviet Union6 and were also
against the policy of collectivization.7 However, Bukharin's
power in the party was so strong that in May 1929 Coleman
reported that the Soviet Union's secret police,

the GPU,8

refused to arrest Bukharin.9 Yet by August, Stalin had purged

4 In 1927 at the 15th Congress of the Russian Communist
Party the name of the party was changed to the All Union
Communist
Party
of
Bolsheviks
which
reflected
the
incorporation of all of the republic's communist parties into
the former RCP(B). Coleman to Secretary of State, 25 February
1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/5911; Coleman to Secretary
of State, 12 March 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/5960.
5 Baer, 181.
6 Coleman to Secretary of State,
861.00/54/6142.

15 May 1929, RG 59,

7 J. Webb Benton to Secretary of State, 18 February 1929,
RG 59, 861.00/38/2170.
8 GPU was
the abbreviation
for
Gosudarstvennoye
Politicheksoe Upravleniyer which translated to the State
Political Administration Soviet Security Service.
Paxton,
157.
9 Coleman to Secretary of State,
861.00/56/6161.

28 May 1929, RG 59,
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most

of

Bukharin's

support

from

the

AUCP(B),10

November, Bukharin was expelled from the Politburo.

and

in

The Riga

specialists reminded Washington that with Bukharin's expulsion
from the Politburo, the last of Lenin's old Bolsheviks had
been removed from power.

Stalin now had complete control of

the most powerful organ of the Soviet government.11
Loy M. Henderson, who was stationed at Riga, wrote that
by 1930, Stalin occupied:
a central position between, on the one hand, those
elements of the party that were insisting that regardless
of obstacles and possible dangers the party should press
for the immediate realization of communist ideals in the
Soviet Union and for quick social revolutions abroad under
communist leadership, and, on the other hand, those
elements that believed that the success of the party's
world revolutionary program was so dependent on the
development of a powerful and impregnable Soviet Union
that the party in making basic policy decisions should be
given primary consideration to the security and
strengthening of the Soviet State.
As the Comintern mobilized to carry out Stalin's orders,
the Soviet specialists reported that there was division within
the ranks of the CPUSA.

Many American communists were angered

by the expulsion of Trotsky and Bukharin from the Politburo
and AUCP(B).

The Comintern leaders instructed the Americans

10 Coleman to Secretary of State, 9 February 1929, RG 59,
861.00/5885; Coleman to Secretary of State, 6 April 1929, RG
59, 861.00/6027.
11 Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 27 August 1929, RG
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6367; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 20 November 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/88;
Baer, 187; MacKenzie, 485; Lowenhardt, 25.
12

.

As quoted in Baer, 187-88.
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to end their factionalism and carry out the instructions of
the

AUCP(B)

Profintern

and

Stalin.

leaders

In

instructed

addition,
the

the

CPUSA

to

Comintern

and

increase

its

membership by concentrating their recruiting efforts on new
immigrants, unemployed workers and African-Americans.13 These
groups were deeply affected by the Great Depression and by
racism in the United States.14 To attract them, the Comintern
ordered all cells of the CPUSA to be integrated.

To enforce

this rule, they ordered an African-American named Otto Hall
to head the CPUSA cell in Norfolk, Virginia.

Members who

opposed the policy were expelled.15
The Soviet specialists reported that in November 1929 a
group of American members of the Comintern and Profintern
visited the Soviet Union.

The Soviet press listed the names

which were later sent to the DEEA with the report.

These

members of the CPUSA pledged that they would defend the Soviet
Union, the homeland of socialism.

If the United States were

to wage war against the Soviet Union, they would start a civil
war.

They claimed that African-Americans were sympathetic to

the Soviet Union and declared that American communists who
supported Trotsky or Bukharin were to be expelled from the

13 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 November 1929, RG
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6568.
14 Coleman to Secretary of State, 22 March 1929, RG 84,
Russian Book 125, 800R/5994.
15 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 August 1929, RG 84,
Russian Book 125, 800R/6350.
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CPUSA.16

In

1929,

neither

the

Russians

nor

the

specialists

expected the period of nonrecognition to end in the near
future.17

Despite the lack of diplomatic relations,

between the two nations was strong.

However,

trade

the Amtorg

Trading Cooperation founded in 1924 by the Soviet government
to conduct trade with American business, reported that Soviet
officials did not impress visiting American businessmen.18
Amtorg officials wanted Soviet officials to be more open and
courteous to American businessmen who visited the Soviet Union
and allow them access to all industrial sites.

Since the

embryonic Soviet industries were dependent on the importation
of machinery and tractors manufactured in the United States,
the American businessmen had to be well treated.

In addition,

the Amtorg officials wanted Russians who worked there to study
the American language and customs.

The Riga specialists also

noted that Amtorg was involved in propaganda activities; this
in

turn

troubled

Congressman

Hamilton

Fish.

Fish

had

corresponded with Kelley throughout the 1920's concerning the

16 Coleman to Secretary of State, 22 March 1929, RG 84,
Russian Book 125, 800R/5994; Coleman to Secretary of State,
19 August 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6350; Coleman
to Secretary of State, 19 November 1929, RG 84, Russian Book
125, 800R/6568.
17 Coleman to Secretary of State, 31 December 1929, RG
84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674.
18 Robert F. Kelley, "Policy of the United States Towards
Soviet Russia," 1929, in Kelley Papers; Bennett, 114-116.
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Soviet Union and the Comintern.

In 1930 Fish requested that

Kelley provide the reports from Riga concerning the Amtorg's
subversive activities to his congressional committee.

Fish

used these reports to prove that Amtorg, like the Comintern
and CPUSA was involved in propaganda activities in the United
States.19
The Soviet government was also concerned with their image
in the United States.

In an attempt to improve their image,

the government created Intourist to help foreign businessmen
with transportation and hotel accommodations while in the
Soviet Union as well as provide guides who spoke English.20
Despite these services, American journalists reported problems
within the Soviet Union.

In their fact-gathering discussions

with the Riga specialists, the journalists acknowledged that
the Soviet's industrial capacity had made significant gains
during the first five-year plan.

However, the standard of

living for the average Russian was poor.

When the journalists

printed their stories, the Soviet government accused them of
being involved in a propaganda campaign to slander the Soviet

19 Coleman to Secretary of State, 29 February 1929, RG
84, Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/5869; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 5 June 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6192;
Robert F. Kelley to Congressman Hamilton Fish, 16 December
1926, Box 2, Folder 4, in Kelley Papers; Kelley to Fish, 4
June 1930, Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers.
20

Coleman to Secretary of State, 17 May 1929, RG 84
Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6150; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 27 May 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 122, 020-670R/6160.
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Union

and

AUCP(B) .21

They

contended

that

the

American

journalists lied when they claimed that the Comintern and
CPUSA were subversive organs of the Soviet Union and AUCP(B).
The Soviets used the negative reports made by the American
journalists to justify the propaganda efforts of the AUCP(B)
and the Comintern.22
The

Riga

specialists

recommended

to

the

DEEA

that

although the Soviet government was angered by the American
journalist reports,

they would remain as a major trading

partner with the United States.

They also reported that the

industrial strength of the Soviet Union would continue to
improve.

However,

socialist

theories,

because
the

their

Soviet

methods

were

government

based

would

difficulties meeting the goals of the five-year plan.

on

have
The

Soviet Union needed American machinery to achieve the goal of
making the Soviet Union a self-sufficient socialist state.
The Riga specialists recommended no change in the policy of

21 In an effort to further discredit the Soviet
government, Kelley recommended that a prominent American
communist Emma Goldman be allowed to return to the United
States.
Goldman had been deported in 1921 for communist
agitation. However, after living in the Soviet Union she had
become an opponent of the Soviet government which did not
allow dissent.
Kelley contended that she would be "an
effective antidote to the propaganda with regard to the
political and economic conditions in Soviet Russia," if she
were allowed to return.
Kelley to Secretary of State, 16
November 1926, Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers; Filene, 147.
22 Coleman to Secretary of State, 7 January 1929, RG 84
Russian Book 125, 800R/5815; Coleman to Secretary of State,
31 December 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674.
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nonrecognition

and that the

Soviet Union's

dependence

on

American machinery be used as a leverage to force them to
accept the United State's terms for recognition at some future
date.23
From 1930 to

1931 the Riga specialists continued to

report the ebb and flow of Stalin's dictatorship.

They noted

that the Soviet government's campaign to force the Russian
peasants on the collective farms continued unabated.

The

Soviet government also initiated a plan to discredit claims
by the United States that the Comintern was a subversive
propaganda organ of the AUCP(B).

The Riga specialists were

especially disturbed by the terrorist tactics Stalin used to
achieve his political and economic objectives in the Soviet
Union.

While

Bukharin's

communist

followers

willingly

accepted their fates, the Russian peasants fought Stalin.24
Coleman reported that
Stalm

planned

to

in retaliation

annihilate

the

for

the

peasants.

25

resistance,
Based

on

interviews with Russian peasants leaving the Soviet Union and

23 Coleman to Secretary of State, 19 April 1929, RG 84,
Russian Book 122, 020R-670R/6354; Coleman to Secretary of
State, 31 December 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6674;
Baer, 187-89.
24 Coleman to Secretary of State, 26 February 1929, RG
59, 86.5017/54/5923; Coleman to Secretary of State, 28 May
1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6165; Coleman to Secretary
of State, 8 January 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 800R.
25 Coleman to Secretary of State, 3 January 1930, RG 84,
Russian Book 144, 800R/6683; Coleman to Secretary of State,
7 November 1930, RG 84; Russian Book 145, 800R/7340.
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Soviet press accounts, the Soviet specialists reported that
the government confiscated all tractors and sent them to the
collective farms.

Peasants were forced to turn their crops

over to the government at below-market value.

Fearful of

being classified as a kulak and being deported,
destroyed excess livestock and crops.
shortage

of

government

grain

was

and

unable

draft
to

This resulted in a

animals.

transport

peasants

In

crops

addition,
to

the

Ultimately food shortages occurred throughout

the

cities.

the Soviet

Union.26
By the end of 1931, the specialists now joined by the
first graduates of Kelley's specialist program,

George F.

Kennan and William M. Gwynn, reported that Stalin's five-year
plan would not meet the industrial and agricultural goals set
in 1928.27
not

Russian peasants who moved to the factories were

properly

trained

to

run

and

maintain

the machinery.

Coleman to Secretary of State, 14 May 1929, Russian
Book 130, RG 84, 800R/6141; Coleman to Secretary of State, 7
June 1929, RG 84, Russian Book 125, 800R/6196; Coleman to
Secretary of States, 3 January 193 0, RG 84, Russian Book 144,
800R/6683; Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 4 February 1930,
RG 84, Russian Book 149, 861R/Telegram 5; Sussdorff to
Secretary of State, 14 March 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 149,
861R/6848; Coleman to Secretary of State, 21 July 30; RG 84,
Russian Book 149, 861.31R/Telegram 34; Coleman to Secretary
of State, 7 November 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 145, 800R/7340;
Lelchuk, 164-73.
27 "The American Foreign Service Journal," February 1933:
61, in Kelley Papers; Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950. 33-34;
Coleman to Secretary of State, 8 January 1930, RG 84, Russian
Book 144, 800R; Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January
1931, RG 84 Russian Book 167, 800R/7448.
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Foreign technicians were needed to maintain Soviet factories
but

they

were

disliked

communists and peasants.
Union

and

food

and

distrusted

by

both

Russian

Inflation was rampant in the Soviet

shortages

abounded. By

April

1931,

the

specialists reported that Stalin was forced to institute a
policy called the "Mini-NEP" in certain areas of the Soviet
Union.

This policy allowed peasants to be given small plots

of land controlled by the state where they could grow and sell
food at market prices.

Coleman wrote that these events were

warnings to Stalin and the AUCP(B) that planned economies did
not work.28
In addition to the problems in the Soviet Union, Stalin
faced resistance within the CPUSA to his programs.
1930,

the

directly

Riga

involved

specialists
in the

reported that

operations

In March

Stalin

of the

became

CPUSA.

Many

American communists refused to obey Stalin and the AUCP(B).
Despite

the

Comintern

recommendations

and

Profintern

in

made

by

1929,

American counterparts remained low.

the

leaders

membership

of

in

the

their

Some American communists

argued that since the economic and political history of the
United States was unique, socialism in the United States would
evolve differently from the Soviet Union.

Finally economic

and political reforms made by the United States government

28

Coleman to Secretary of State,
Russian Book 149, 815.R/6690; Coleman
RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7609.

9
January 1930,RG 84,
to Secretary ofState,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

78

further delayed the evolution of the United States towards
socialism.29
Stalin rebuked those who disagreed with his policies.
He asserted that capitalism was the same regardless of the
country,

and that the United States would only become a

capitalist

state

Marxist-Leninist

if

the

doctrine

CPUSA

remained

as he

defined

faithful

to

it.

further

He

the

contended that factionalism within the CPUSA had to end and
that there would be no compromise with those who followed
Trotsky and Bukharin.

Stalin predicted that the United States

was on the verge of war with its great imperialist rival,
Great Britain, and that when the war began, the CPUSA must be
ready to lead the bolshevik revolution in the United States.30
In November 1930,
goals

the specialists reported

Stalin's

for the Comintern and its subordinate groups.

The

communist parties of the Comintern and Prof intern accepted the
policy

of

priority.

building

socialism

in

the

Soviet

Union

as

a

Stalin informed the communists that in an attempt

to end the Great Depression, the capitalist nations would go
to war with each other,

and the Soviet Union in order to

pursue new markets and raw materials.
members

of the

When this occurred,

Comintern were to mobilize

the masses

to

OQ

Sussdorff to Secretary of State, 14 March 1930, RG 84,
Russian Book 147, 800R/6849; Coleman to Secretary of State,
19 June 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144, 800R/7054.
30 Ibid.
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protest, strike and, if necessary, create a civil war against
the capitalist governments in order to protect the Soviet
Union.

The Great Depression was the precursor to the world

proletarian revolution.31
Riga also noted that the Profintern was very active in
the United States and its colony, the Philippines, in 193031.

In the United States the Prof intern worked with the

Comintern to attract African-Americans and Filipinos to their
organizations.

In their efforts to recruit African-Americans,

American communists asserted that in a socialist nation racial
segregation did not exist.

The racially motivated trial of

the Scottsboro boys was used by the American communists to
prove

their

claim

and

recruit

new

members.

Propaganda

material which specifically targeted African-Americans was
printed by both organizations overseas and smuggled into the
United States.32
The Comintern and Profintern supported the formation of
the Philippine Communist Party (PCP) in 1930.

A series of

small insurrections initiated by the PCP against the United

31 Coleman to Secretary of State, 7 November 1930, RG 84,
Russian Book 145, 800R/7340; Coleman to Secretary of State,
5 February 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7423.
32

John E. Kehl (Consul General, Hamburg) to Coleman, 17
April 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 166, 800R/7630; Felix Cole to
Secretary of State, 5 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163,
800R/7773; Coleman to Secretary of State, 26 June 1931, RG 84,
Russian Book 163, 800R/7823; David MacGowan to Secretary of
State, 3 July 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7837; Cole
to Secretary of State, 28 July 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163,
800R/7904.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

80

States were organized but were quickly extinguished by the
colonial

government.

The

Riga

specialists

noted

the

communists in the Philippines took advantage of the fact that
most

of

the

land

in the archipelago was

owned by

a

few

influential families who ruled the islands with the support
of the Americans.

The PCP informed the Filipinos that the

United States was considering granting them independence only
because American
wanted

to

end

sugar
the

beet

and

importation

cotton
of

oil manufacturers

competitive

and

expensive sugar and coconut oil from the Philippines.

less

Because

the archipelago was a territory of the United States, there
were no duties on Philippine imports.33
The communists played on the racial fears of the AfricanAmericans in the United States by claiming that Filipinos were
brought to the United States because they were cheap labor and
would replace them in the factories.

By contrast Filipinos

were told that once the colony was granted independence, they
would be allowed in the United States.34
of

the

charges

made

by

the

communists

Unfortunately, many
concerning

racial

33 Coleman to Secretary of State, 31 May 1931, RG 84,
Russian Book 165, 800R/7733; Coleman to Secretary of State,
6 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 165, 800R/7824.
34 Cole to Secretary of State, 5 June 1931, RG 84,
Russian Book 163, 800R/7773; Coleman to Secretary of State,
6 June 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 165, 800R/7824; Coleman to
Secretary of State, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7823;
MacGowan to Secretary of State, 3 July 1931, RG 84, Russian
Book 163, 800R/7837; Cole to Secretary of State, 28 July 1931,
RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7904.
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prejudice against the African-Americans and Filipinos in the
early 1930's were true.
Beginning in 1930, Congress became concerned about the
activities of the Comintern, Profintern and their subordinate
organizations.
investigate

They authorized Congressman Hamilton Fish to

Amtorg

and

the

activities

organizations in the United States.

of

all

Comintern

The committee was to

determine if these organizations advocated "the overthrow by
violence the Government of the United States, or attempt to
undermine our republican form of government by inciting riots,
sabotage, and revolutionary disorders."35 Fish reguested that
Kelley provide the committee with the Riga reports for use as
evidence.

Kelley

sent

the

reports

requested

to

the

committee.36 In the end the committee, armed with the reports,
concluded

that

Amtorg,

the

Comintern

and

the

CPUSA were

subversive propaganda organs of the United States government.
However, they did not restrict their activities.37
The Soviet Union reacted angrily to the actions of the
Fish Committee.

They

insisted that the

committee

should

investigate the racial violence against the African-Americans

35 House Resolution 180, 5 March 1930, Box 3, Folder 5,
in Kelley Papers; Filene, 229-34.
36 Kelley to Undersecretary of State Cotton, 4 June 1930,
Box 3, Folder 4, in Kelley Papers; Robert F. Kelley,
"Communist Activities in the United States," Box 3, Folder 4,
in Kelley Papers.
37 Kelley to Undersecretary of State Cotton, 4 June 1930,
Box 3, Folder 5, in Kelley Papers.
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and the cruel imperialist policies of the United States in the
Philippines and Latin America.

The Riga reports indicated

that the Soviet government reacted in this manner because the
Congress was considering restricting Soviet imports to the
United States based on the findings of the Fish Committee.
Congress accused the Soviet Union of exporting goods to the
United States that were made by slave or forced labor.

The

Soviet government asserted that forced labor was only used to
build

roads

and

canals.

On

the

other hand,

the

Soviet

government accused the United States of considering joining
an economic blockade with other capitalist nations against the
Soviet Union.

The Soviet government warned the United States

to carefully consider its course of action.

They reminded the

United States that trade without recognition was good between
the two nations.

However, if the United States persisted in

its political attacks, the Soviet government would not allow
American exports into the Soviet Union.

They asserted that

the United States needed trade with the Soviet Union, however
•

•

•

•

the Soviet Union did not need trade with the United States.

38

Coleman on his own initiative responded to the Soviet
accusations in two reports to the State Department.

He wrote

that under international law the Soviet Union was responsible

38

Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January 1931, RG 84,
Russian Book 167, 800R/7448; Coleman to Secretary of State,
12 February 1931, RG 84, Russian Book 163, 800R/7496; Coleman
to Secretary of State, 29 April 1931, Russian Book 163,
800R/7741.
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for the actions of the Comintern and its subservient organs.
Most of the leaders of the Comintern were members of the
Soviet government and the AUCP(B); thus the Comintern and its
subsidiary organs were organs of the Soviet government.

He

maintained further that the Soviet government controlled the
means of production in the Soviet Union.

Many of the peasants

and workers were coerced into accepting the jobs assigned to
them

by

the

inability

to

Soviet
chose

government.
their

jobs

He
was

asserted
compulsory

that

their

labor

and

violated United States trade laws.39
In 1932, Wilbur

Carr, head of the DFSA, sent Robert F.

Skinner to replace Coleman

in Riga.

Carr made this move as

part of his continuing struggle within the State Department
to end the policy of allowing FSOs to specialize
affairs of one country.

in the

Skinner was a generalist who shared

Carr's belief that FSOs should not specialize in one country
or region.

Furthermore, Skinner did not believe in the policy

of nonrecognition.

During his first year, he tried to impose

his views on the mission.

Instead of writing lengthy reports,

Skinner wanted the Soviet experts to submit brief abstracts
to the State Department.

The Riga staff and his superiors at

the DEEA resisted his efforts to change established methods

39 Secretary of
State to American Legation (Riga),29
January 1930, RG 84, Russian
Book 149, 850.4R; Coleman to
Secretary of State, 14 July 1930, RG 84, Russian Book 144,
800R/7101; Coleman to Secretary of State, 24 January 1931, RG
84, Russian Book 167, 800R/7448.
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and after one year of resistance, he complied with the will
of his superiors and became a reluctant supporter of the
policy

of

ncnrecognition.40

Fortunately

for

Skinner

that

policy would soon change.
The

year

1932

was

significant

because

presidential election year in the United States.

it

was

Franklin D.

Roosevelt was the Democratic Party's candidate for President.
He was known as a liberal and many of his followers favored
established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.

In

anticipation of Roosevelt's election Russian specialists at
Riga and the DEEA made preparations to conduct negotiations
which would

lead to diplomatic relations with the Soviet

Union.41 At Skinner's request seven specialists, Felix Cole,
Clarence B. Hewes, W. J. Gallman, William M. Gwynn, Landreth
M. Harrison, George F. Kennan and John A. Lehrs, compiled a
report entitled

"Reflections

on Russia."

Skinner was

so

impressed with their response that he submitted their paper
enclosures with his report.42
Skinner determined that the specialists felt no hostility
towards

the

Russians,

however

they

communist ideology of the AUCP(B).
similar

conclusions

concerning the

were

hostile

to

the

The seven men reached
Soviet Union.

First,

40 Propas, "The State Department," 144-49.
41 Baer, 216-17; Propas, "The State Department," 163-64.
42 Robert F. Skinner to Secretary of State,
1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801R/193.

24 March
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political change in the Soviet Union would be revolutionary
and not evolutionary.

Second, the Soviet Union only wanted

formal relations with the United States in order to receive
economic loans or credits from American banks.

The Soviet

Union may be persuaded to pay its past debts

if it were

politically and economically advantageous to do so.

Third,

the Soviet government would reduce its involvement with the
Comintern only if it were politically expedient.

Fourth, when

the United States initiated negotiations for recognition, it
should be guided by principle and not political expediency.
Finally, recognition would benefit the Soviet Union more than
the United States.
was

a major

Even without recognition the Soviet Union

importer

of

American

products.

Again

they

reiterated the fact that the Soviet Union needed American
machinery to reach the goals of the second five-year plan.43
The

specialists

believed

that

if

the

United

States

recognized the Soviet Union the following could be expected:
First,

the

Soviet

Union

would

repudiate

any

agreements

concerning the Comintern if it were in its interest to do so.
Second, once the United States granted the Soviet Union "de
facto" recognition, the Soviet government would expect to be
given most favored nation treaty status.

Finally, the Soviet

government would expect the United States to force American
bankers to give the Soviet Union favorable credits and loans

43 Ibid.
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without

preconditions.

The

Riga

specialists

based

this

assessment on a thorough study of all treaties and agreements
signed by the Soviet Union with other nations.44
In his report, Skinner warned the State Department to
approach the issue of recognition with caution.

The Soviet

Union had never fulfilled any treaty in which they agreed to
pay previous debts nor had they desisted in their support of
the Comintern.

Skinner advised:

All in all, it appears to be necessary that we continue
our attitude of watchful waiting, hoping that the Soviet
government will mend its way, always disposed, ourselves,
to be bear in mind our long-standing friendship with the
Russian people and to enter relations with their
government on the same terms which have guided our
relations with other governments born out of revolutionary
conditions.45
However, there were other issues to consider.
Japan seized Manchuria.

In 1931

Japanese aggression in China worried

both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The specialists

reported that the Soviet Union was prepared to

establish

diplomatic relations with the United States in order to deter
further Japanese aggression in China.

The Red Army was not

strong enough to fight Japan and the Soviet Union needed the
help of the United States to stop Japanese aggression.

The

Soviet government believed that the visit of Army chief of
staff, General Douglas MacArthur, to Poland in the fall of
1932 was a precursor to Soviet-American negotiations.

44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
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believed

that

MacArthur

was

in

Poland

to

ascertain

the

strength of the Red Army and to warn the Polish government not
to attack the Soviet Union in the event of a war with Japan.46
In November 1932, Roosevelt was elected President.

After

the election, the Riga specialists again thoroughly studied
the various trade agreements and treaties between the Soviet
Union and other nations in anticipation of a change in United
States policy.

In April 1933, Skinner and Kennan reported the

results of their research to the State Department.

Kennan

advised that all treaties with the Soviets should be specific
written agreements.
would

be

ideology.

dealing

American diplomats were warned that they
with

a

government

based

on

communist

The Soviet government controlled all political and

economic activities in the Soviet Union; therefore special
clauses would have to be written into the treaty which would
protect

the

civil

liberties

of

American

citizens.

In

addition, the United States would have to establish strict
economic and trade guidelines to protect the interests of
American businessmen from the Soviet government's "foreign

46 Skinner to Secretary of State, 24 February 1932, RG
84, Russian Book 200, 030R-800R/87; William N. Castle
(Division of Western European Affairs) to Skinner, 17 December
1933, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801-R/143; Skinner to Secretary
of State, 20 December 1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 801R/1002; Skinner to Secretary of State, 23 March 1932, RG 84,
Russian Book 224, 820R/1232.
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trade monopoly."47
draft

of

a

Skinner followed Kennan's report with a

proposed

commercial

treaty

recommendations found in Kennan's report.

based

on

the

Both men believed

that it was important that the agreements contain specific
language which restricted interference by both nations

in

internal political affairs.48
In June 1933, the DEEA informed the specialists that in
order to establish diplomatic relations,

the Soviet Union

would have to negotiate and pay some of the previous debts.
According to the DEEA, the Soviet Union owed the United States
$2,614,025.70 from the Tsar's government and $327,583,071.37
from the Provisional government.

When Great

Britain and

France established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,
they negotiated a settlement to pay the debts owed to both
nations.

After

eleven years,

no payments had been made.

However, the division believed that Stalin would be willing
to pay the Provisional government's debt in the form of an
interest payment on the loan, and only place a counter-claim
against

the

recommended

Tsarist
that

government

private

debts.

debts

be

The

DEEA

arbitrated

further
at

the

47

George F. Kennan, "Notes on Russian Commercial Treaty
Procedures,11 with cover letter, Skinner to Secretary of State,
5 April 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 233, 631R/1270.
48

Robert F. Skinner to Secretary of State,
1933, RG-84, Russian Book 215, 631R-US/1299.

20 April
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international court at the Hague.49
The Riga specialists believed that the United States
would be able to bargain from a position of strength when
negotiations were initiated with the Soviet Union.

The Soviet

Union needed American equipment in order to meet the goals of
the second five-year plan.

On the other hand, the economy of

the United States did not depend on exports to the Soviet
Union

to

sustain

it.

This

would

not

allow

the

Soviet

government to hold an agreement hostage to a threatened trade
embargo.

Finally, the specialists recommended that American

businessmen not base their trade requirements on the Soviet
Union's economic figures because they were manipulated to
obtain bargains from the western market.

In order to provide

American businessmen with accurate figures, a special economic
foundation should be established which would focus on the
Soviet economy and make recommendations based on economic data
obtained from neutral sources.

The foundation would be funded

by both the public and private sectors.50 The specialists and
Stalin

were

clearly

in

diplomatic relations more,

disagreement

as

to

who

needed

the Soviet Union or the United

States.
While the Soviet government may have been prepared to

49

Division of Eastern European Affairs to American
Legation (Riga), 19 June 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 224, 851R.
50 Cole to Secretary of State, 24 August 1933, RG 84,
Russian Book 215, 631.R-US/1540; Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950.
50-51.
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make concessions to the United States in order to establish
diplomatic relations, it made no concessions to the Russian
people.
which

The Riga specialists cited Soviet press accounts
reported

synagogues
offices.
the men

the

and

closing

mosques

and

into

conversion

factories,

of

grain

churches,
silos

and

Only women in Russia attended religious services,
stayed

government.

away

in

fear

of being

persecuted

by

the

This was purportedly done at the request of the

Soviet workers.51

Russians who married American workers in

the Soviet Union were terrorized by the secret police, the
NKVD.

Russians fleeing the Soviet Union reported that the

people were tired of the demands placed on them to meet the
goals

of

the

second

five-year

plan

shortages of food and consumer goods.
industrial resources to

and

still

being

build up the

terrorized

and

there

were

Stalin diverted scarce
Soviet armed

instead of manufacturing consumer products.
were

that

coerced

forces

Russian peasants
by

the

Soviet

government to move on to the collective farms and the Soviet
government continued subversive propaganda activities under
the auspices of the Comintern against the United States.52

51 Cole to Secretary of State, 8 January 1932, RG 84,
Russian Book 195, 840.4R-850.32R/8368; Cole to Secretary of
State, 7 September 1932, RG 84, Russian Book 195, 840.4R850.32R/8368; Cole to Secretary of State, 9 December 1933, RG
84, Russian Book 215; 800R/1752.
52 A. E. Carleton to Secretary of State, 30 December
1932, RG 84, Russian Book 201, 800R/51; Edward S. Crocker to
Secretary of State, 1 March 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 224,
804.4R/703; Skinner to Secretary of State, 21 April 1933, RG
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Nevertheless,

in

October

1933,

Roosevelt,

after

determining that Congress and the American people supported
the issue, decided that it was time to recognize the Soviet
government.

The President was under pressure from American

business to establish relations with the Soviet Union.

This

would enable the United States to increase its exports, thus
creating more jobs during the depression.
very concerned about Japanese aggression.

Roosevelt was also
He realized that

the American people would not support unilateral action to
curb Japanese aggression in Asia.

However,

if the United

States established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union,
Japan might be intimidated into ending its expansionist policy
■, • 53
in Asia.
From this point on, Roosevelt assumed responsibility for
Soviet-American relations until he died in 1945.

Like Woodrow

Wilson, Roosevelt delegated the task of approaching the Soviet
government with the issue of recognition to special envoys.
The envoys were two of his two closest associates,
Morgenthau and William C. Bullitt.

Henry

The president believed

that the FSOs of the State Department would be hesitant in
supporting his policy.

Bullitt, however, turned to Kelley and

the DEEA staff to provide him with materials necessary to

84, Russian Book 233, 800R/1301; Cole to Secretary of State,
9 December 1933, RG 84, Russian Book 215, 800R/1752.
53 Baer, 236-37; Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and
American Foreign Policy.
1932-1945
(New York:
Oxford
University Press, 1979), 79-80.
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negotiate the treaty with the Soviets.
with Roosevelt's approval,

He also chose Kelley,

as a member of the negotiating

team.54
The Soviet government accepted Roosevelt's invitation to
begin

negotiations.

Maxim

Litvinov,

one

of

the

more

experienced diplomats in the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,
was sent by Stalin to negotiate on behalf of the Soviet Union.
The

president's

advisors

and

the

DEEA

established

the

conditions for recognition which would serve as the basis for
negotiations.

On the issue of debt payments,

the United

States would focus on repayment of the loans made to the
Kerensky government and would make a provision acknowledging
repayment for private property seized by the Soviet government
which was

owned by Americans.

Comintern

would

be

The Soviet Union

prohibited

from

sending

and the
communist

propaganda into the United States and American citizens would
be allowed to practice their religion.

Roosevelt added the

conditions regarding religious freedom in order to gain the
support

of American

religious groups who were

diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union.55
American nationals

residing

in the

opposed to
Furthermore,

Soviet Union who were

arrested would have quick access to United States diplomats
or consular officers and would be entitled to a public and

Baer, 236-37;
Department," 163-67.

Dallek

79-80;

Propas,

"The

55 Baer, 238-43; Dallek, 79.
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just trial and would be adequately protected from ambiguous
charges such as "economic espionage."56
Washington on 8 November 1933.

Litvinov arrived in

Negotiations were difficult.

He refused to sign any agreement concerning the payment of
debts,

nor would he acknowledge that the Comintern was a

subversive organ of the Soviet Union.

He was angered with the

documentation presented by Bullitt and Kelley which supported
the position of the United

States.

According to Kennan,

Litvinov knew that the Russian section of the Riga mission
provided the documentation.

He

informed Kelley that the

DEEA's records were superior to the Soviet government's own
records.

By

10

November,

negotiations

had

reached

an

impasse.57
The impasse was broken when Roosevelt decided to meet
with Litvinov.
agreement

By 15 November they reached a gentleman's

concerning

recognition.

the

establishment

of

diplomatic

Litvinov agreed that the Soviet Union would not

interfere in the internal affairs of the United States.
the

disappointment

of

Kelley

and

the

specialists,

To
the

Comintern was not mentioned by name; they believed this would
allow the Soviet government to continue to deny it had any
control over the activities of the Comintern.

The issue of

debt payments was to be negotiated after normal diplomatic

56 Baer, 237, 242.
57 Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950. 47-48,
45; Dallek, 79-80.

83-84; Baer, 244-
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relations

between

the

two

nations

had

been

established.

American citizens in the Soviet Union were granted the right
to practice their religion, and the American consul was to be
immediately contacted when an American citizen was arrested.
On

16 November 1933,

Roosevelt announced that the United

States had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union.58
For thirteen years, the Riga specialists observed the
Soviet Union.

They collected the evidence that was used by

Bullitt and Kelley to effectively argue the position of the
United States during the negotiations to establish diplomatic
relations.

They advised the government that in order to make

the Soviet Union acknowledge its international obligations,
agreements must be in writing and contain specific language.
They also warned the government that the negotiations should
not be based on political expediency.

Unfortunately for the

Riga specialists the world situation forced the United States
to reconsider the policy of nonrecognition with the Soviet
Union.

Roosevelt believed that aggressive nations like Japan,

Italy and later Germany were greater threats to the United
States than the Soviet Union and the Comintern.

In addition,

the president may have decided it was safe to recognize the
Soviet Union based on the fact that even in the midst of a

58

U.S. Department of State, Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations
With
The
Union
Soviet
Socialist
Republics
(Washington, D.C.:
GPO, 1933), 5-13; Baer, 245-55; Dallek,
79-81.
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deep

depression

political
elections.

and

Americans

economic

overwhelmingly

agenda

of

the

CPUSA

rejected
in

the

national

Soviet-American relations entered a new phase with

Roosevelt's election to the presidency.
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CONCLUSION

The reforms initiated by Robert Lansing between 1918 and
1920 served many purposes.

First, the reforms allowed for the

selection of foreign service officers based on capability and
not political patronage.

Second, Lansing set the standard for

FSOs to be professionals dedicated to the art of diplomacy.
Third,

he

established the practice whereby FSOs kept the

president and secretary of state informed about the political
and

economic

stationed.

conditions

in

the

country

where

they

were

Finally, Lansing hoped to end the use of special

envoys by the president.

Special envoys created confusion

both at home and abroad as to who represented the policies of
the United States: the special envoys or the FSOs.

The use

of special envoys could be ended only if the president had
trust and confidence in the abilities of his diplomats.
The Soviet specialists were the type of FSOs Lansing
believed should serve the State Department.

Due in large part

to the reforms he initiated, they were selected because of
their

capability;

dedicated

to

not

political

their profession

patronage.

and kept

They

the United

were
States

government well informed concerning the political activities
of the Soviet Union and the Comintern.

The professional

96
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reputation of the specialists was excellent and they used
their expertise to serve five presidents between 1919 and
1933.
As this thesis has shown, the specialists' memoirs and
the reports they wrote in Riga demonstrated their hostility
to the communist ideology of the Soviet Union.

Yet their task

was

to

in

essence

a

negative

one;

they

expertise to support nonrecognition.

were

use

their

The specialists were

prepared to be flexible and to negotiate with the Soviet Union
on the issue of debt, payments.

However, they believed their

reports proved that the Comintern and its American subsidiary
organization, the CPUSA were organs of the Soviet government.
Such

activities,

which

the

specialists

saw

as

direct

interference in the internal affairs of the United States,
could not be so easily compromised.
acknowledged

and

then

renounced

Until the Soviet Union
the

activities

of

the

Comintern and the CPUSA, the specialists believed it was in
the best interest of the United States to continue the policy
of nonrecognition.
Historians must be careful to evaluate the Riga reports
in the context of the times

in which they were written.

Between 1919 and 1933, the United States and the Soviet Union
were

not two

nations.

super powers

leading two

hostile

blocks

of

During that period, the two nations were part of a

group of great powers that included Great Britain,
Italy, Germany, Japan and China.

France,

Both nations were not part
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of any alliances.

Therefore the relationship between the

United States and the Soviet Union was bilateral.

It was

based on this relationship that the Riga specialists wrote
their reports and came to their conclusions concerning the
Soviet Union.
Due to the clear direction and high standards established
by

Kelley,

the

Riga

specialists

were

able

Russian/Soviet scholars as well as FSOs.

to

evolve

as

The evidence used

by the Riga specialists was the best available under the
conditions in which they operated.

The specialists based

their conclusions on empirical evidence.

Information received

from interviews was tested against other interviews and Soviet
publications for validity.
Soviet

Union

were

Since all publications in the

controlled

by

the

government,

pronouncements found were considered Soviet policy.
especially true after
country and the party.

Stalin assumed

full

control

all

This was
of the

When the archives of the Soviet

government in Russia are opened to the public, historians will
be able

to more accurately evaluate the validity

of

the

methods used by the specialists to study the Soviet Union and
defend the policy of nonrecognition.
If the specialists had a fault it was that they were too
focused, as their critics claimed, on the relationship between
the Soviet Union and the United States.1

The specialists at

1 Yergin, 8-14; Propas, "The State Department," 167-73,
229-31.
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Riga and in the DEEA did not attempt to analyze how the lack
of diplomatic relations with the Soviet effected United States
foreign policy as a whole.

Roosevelt believed that they did

not understand his foreign policy concerns and objectives.
As a result, Roosevelt, like Wilson, returned to the use of
special envoys to implement his foreign policy initiatives in
1933.

Yet one of those envoys, William C. Bullitt,

still

turned to the Riga specialists for advice.

The counsel they

gave

not

was

still

accurate;

it

simply

did

reflect

the

political and international considerations which motivated
Franklin D. Roosevelt.
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